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CHAPTER 1
Succeeding in Irregular Conflict:  
Effective Civil Operations
By Franklin D. Kramer, Thomas A. Dempsey, Joseph Gregoire, 























This	 chapter	 sets	 forth	 a	 four-part	 analysis	 of	 effective	 civil	 operations	
in	irregular	conflict:	first,	setting	forth	the	key	elements	underlying	strategic	




 Context and Complexity
Context	 and	 complexity	 have	 four	 distinct	 elements	 in	 irregular	
conflict.	
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stand	 the	 formal	 and	 informal	 power	 relationships	 of	 society.	National	
and	local	power	relationships	and	the	dynamics	among	ethnic,	religious,	
and	 tribal	groups	will	be	crucial	 to	 fostering	 legitimacy	not	only	at	 the	






























of	 the	nature	of	 the	 security	 environment.	Actions	 are	difficult	 enough	
in	a	permissive	environment	where	violence	is	 limited	or	its	threat	only	















formation,	not	merely	 rebuilding	 existing	 systems.	There	 are	 frequently	







from	those	 that	 characterize	 a	humanitarian	operation.	The	 latter	often	
involves	large	and	rapid	inflows	of	resources	to	meet	basic	human	needs	






longer-term	 phasing;	 2)	 institution	 building,	 and	 3)	most	 importantly,	
local	ownership.	




























less	 than	 the	multiple	 billions	 spent	 on	military	 activities.	Those	 lower	
costs	 are	 consistent	with	 efforts	 elsewhere.	 Programs	 for	 governance	 in	
Bulgaria	 cost	 some	$52	million	over	 an	11-year	period;	 in	Georgia	 ap-
proximately	$37	million	over	a	five-year	period,	and	in	Romania	approxi-




irregular	 conflict	 can	 be	 quite	 costly.	 Establishment	 of	 effective	 police,	
while	not	as	expensive	as	creating	a	military,	does	require	significant	ex-
pense—involving	as	it	does	not	only	training	but	also	materiel	and	logistic	













For	 example,	 in	 a	 non-permissive	 environment,	 those	 institutions	
that	affect	security	arguably	will	need	priority	attention.	The	process	of	
reconstituting	 governmental	 structures	 and	 institutions	 almost	 always	
will	 be	 a	 far	 more	 immediate	 task	 than	 in	 a	 traditional	 development	
scenario	with	a	stable	government.	Ultimately,	the	strength	of	the	gov-
ernmental	 institutions,	 processes	 and	 rule	 of	 law	 will	 be	 the	 bulwark	





deficit”—or	 the	 failure	 to	provide	persons	with	 the	needed	capabilities	
and	 experience	 to	manage	 the	 very	difficult	 problems	 generated	by	 an	










Moreover,	 those	persons	 tend	 to	 lack	experience	 in	 cross-cultural	 inter-
action—and	 cross-cultural	 interaction	often	 is	 crucial.	Beyond	position	
creation,	research	into	effective	methodologies	and	education	in	civilian	












Goals and Priorities 
A	fundamental	question	for	irregular	conflict	is	defining	the	goal—how	
should	success	be	measured—and	how	might	it	change	over	time.	












irregular	challenges	 faced	by	 the	United	States	 in	 recent	years	demonstrates	
that	these	often	encompass	multiple	differentiated	goals	that	change	over	time.
In	 the	 past	 decade	 and	 a	 half,	 the	United	 States	 (generally	with	 allies)	
has	undertaken	irregular	conflicts	as	a	result	of	humanitarian	crisis	(Somalia),	
civil	 war	 and	 ethnic	 cleansing	 (Bosnia,	 Kosovo),	 breakdown	 in	 governance	
(Haiti),	as	a	second	phase	of	an	initial	retaliatory	response	(Afghanistan),	and	
as	a	consequence	of	an	intervention	initially	focused	on	the	threat	of	weapons	
of	mass	destruction	(Iraq).	 In	each	of	 those	circumstances,	 the	 intervention	
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Throughout	the	term	of	the	irregular	conflict,	interveners	should	ask	
what	are	appropriate	milestones	and	end	points.	Another	way	to	ask	this	
question	 is	 “what	 is	 good	 enough”	 realistically	 in	 the	 context	 and	 time	
















and	related	outside	intervention.	Accordingly,	 it	 is	 important	to	specifi-
cally	identify	those	goals	in	each	particular	context	so	activity	by	outside	
interveners	and	the	host	nation	is	directed	toward	achievable	outcomes.
Prioritization of Substantive Effort














as	 to	 how	 to	 reconstruct	 a	 state,	 which,	 given	 that	 there	 is	 an	 irregu-
lar	 conflict,	has	 failed	 in	 its	operational	purposes.	As	noted	below,	any	
agenda	should	be	based	on	a	comprehensive	political,	military,	econom-
ic,	 cultural,	 and	 social	 assessment	of	 the	 state.	 States	do	have	multiple	
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Based	on	appropriate	 assessment,	outside	 interveners	 should	plan	a	
phased	and	appropriate	 sequencing	of	 tasks,	understanding	 that	 the	ul-


































that	 the	goal	of	 the	operation	 is	 to	 create	 a	 sovereign	and	 independent	
host	nation.	Establishing	a	pattern	of	dependence	on	outside	interveners	
is	not	a	 long-term	solution.	Development	of	human	capital	at	all	 levels	
is	 therefore	 critical.	Building	human	capital	 is	difficult	 and	often	 time-
consuming.	Training	usually	is	not	enough—institutions	must	be	created	







To	 be	 sure,	 there	 are	 areas	 on	 the	 non-military	 side	 of	 responding	


























ruption—needs	 far	greater	 analysis	 inasmuch	as	 corruption	can	cause	a	




differences	 where	 what	 would	 be	 considered	 corruption	 in	 the	United	
States	might	be	more	acceptable	elsewhere.	But	it	is	not	the	case	that	the	
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problem	 of	 corruption	 is	 of	 no	 consequence.	Deep	 corruption	 can	 se-
riously	 affect	 the	 population’s	 perspective	 on	 the	 government—and,	 as	
noted,	a	negative	perception	essentially	can	cause	the	attempted	response	
to	irregular	conflict	to	fail.	
There	 will	 not	 be	 any	 simple	 answers—and	 each	 situation	 might	



















discontinuities	 between	 the	 interests	 of	 host	 nation	 political	 elites	 and	
those	of	their	bilateral	and	international	partners.	The	key	points	are	that,	







ners—want.	 	All	 these	complexities	mean	 that	while	 limited	objectives,	




















should	be	 reinforcing.	Accordingly,	 the	process	of	 re-establishing	 legiti-
mate	governments,	which	occurs	at	each	of	 the	 local,	 regional,	 and	na-
tional	level	during	and	after	the	conflict,	is	a	critical	and	priority	task.	
External	interveners,	in	helping	to	establish	interim	governments	or	
supporting	 existing	ones	 in	dealing	with	 local	 and	national	power	bro-




judicial	 systems	 are	 ongoing	 throughout	 an	 irregular	 conflict	 and	 con-















side	 interveners	 should	 be	 aware	 of	 the	 “rules	 of	 the	 game”	 as	 to	 how	
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and	social	norms	of	a	society.	Any	new	legal	code	or	laws	will	necessarily	



























analysis	 to	 refer	 to	 favorable	groups—not	 just	one	minority—and	even	
to	a	majority—but	the	key	point	he	makes	is	that	one	must	know	with	
whom	one	can	work,	initially	and	then	later	as	events	progress.

























of	 kleptocratic	 government	 as	 inevitable,	 demoralizes	 a	 society	 and	 en-
hances	the	perception	of	the	illegitimacy	of	a	regime.	Rampant	corruption	
also	has	an	impact	on	the	donor	community—both	international	financial	





 Based on this analysis, several conclusions can be reached to help orga-




and	 fair	 elections	 to	 ensure	 a	peaceful	 transfer	 of	 power,	 and	 establish-
ment	 of	 certain	 key	 security	 institutions	 (e.g.,	military,	 border	 control)	
to	provide	stability—are	necessary.	However,	 important	building	blocks	









underlying	political	 and	 economic	 structures	of	 the	host	nation,	which	
are	much	more	important	than	abstract	discussions	as	to	the	relationship	
between	central	and/or	regional	and	local	governments.
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 Integrating Security and Governance:  
Policing, Non-State Actors, and Justice 








ing	 functionality	 to	 the	 justice	 system.	Each	of	 these	 elements	 involves	





















operations;	and	what	 is	 the	relationship	of	 the	police	to	the	national,	
























including	 “right-hand	 seat”	 guidance,	must	 be	 jointly	 developed	 and	
implemented,	with	due	 recognition	of	 the	 legitimacy	 issues	 raised	by	
outside	control	of	or	participation	in	host	nation	policing	activities.
Second,	police	 training,	 itself,	 is	best	done	by	specialized,	knowl-
edgeable	 trainers.	 In	a	permissive	environment,	police	capacity	build-
ing	should	be	conducted	by	personnel	with	training	and	experience	as	
civil	 law-enforcement	 officers.	 It	 is	 certainly	 possible	 for	 the	military	
to	 provide	 police	 training	 if	 the	 trainers	 are	 knowledgeable	 in	 police	
techniques.	If	the	military	is	used	in	such	a	role—generally	because	of	
the	lack	of	other	available	resources	and/or	the	problems	of	scale—there	






In	 non-permissive	 environments,	 direct	 military	 support	 and	 opera-
tional	collaboration	between	police	and	military	units	will	be	required	
to	enable	host	nation	police	operations;	military	and	law-enforcement	
planners	 should	 incorporate	 that	 requirement	 into	 stabilization	plan-
ning	models.
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police	 resources.	Mobilizing	 these	 resources	 and	 sustaining	 necessary	
levels	of	 funding	over	 time	demands	a	very	 significant	amount	of	 in-
ternational	 support.	Failure	 to	provide—and	 sustain—such	assistance	














Seventh,	 policing	 activities	 likely	 will	 differ	 in	 important	 ways,	













































































When	militia	 and/or	 other	 non-state	 actors	 are	 used	 to	 generate	






























































the	 law	 and	how	 it	 is	 to	be	 applied.	 Interveners	 and	 the	host	nation	






While	 intervention	 for	 stability	 operations	 purposes	 often	means	
that	 the	 rule	of	 law	 is	not	operating	 in	 the	host	nation,	 there	almost	
always	will	be	a	host	nation	rule	of	law	framework	or	frameworks.	Iden-
























the	political	processes	of	 governance.	The	 rule	of	 law	model	 adopted	





















societies	 rely	 heavily	 on	 various	 types	 of	 local	 justice	 and	 customary	
practice.15	A	local	approach	could	be	invaluable—justices	of	the	peace	










In	at	 least	 some	circumstances,	one	approach	 to	be	considered	 to	
remedy	 some	 judicial	 deficiencies	 is	 to	 temporarily	 supplement	 the	
judges	 of	 the	 host	 country	with	 judges	 from	 the	 outside—somewhat	





ated.16	There	 can	be	 little	doubt	 that	 this	 is	not	 a	perfect	 solution.	 It	
might	undermine	 the	 legitimacy	of	 the	host	nation,	 at	 a	minimum.17	
But	the	question	is	whether	the	loss	of	legitimacy	generated	by	the	use	of	
outside	judges	will	be	more	harmful	to	establishment	of	governance	than	












that	 should	be	addressed	 in	 the	assessment	process.	Corrections	must	
be	included	in	this	assessment	as	well,	to	ensure	that	judicial	outcomes	
are	adequately	supported	by	the	appropriate	penal	institutions.	Where	

































Broadly	 speaking,	 then,	 the	economic	path	 to	 success	 in	an	 irregu-
lar	conflict	involves	restoration	of	pre-conflict	livelihoods,	re-opening	of	
markets,	and	re-establishment	of	a	governance	framework	that	can	sustain	











Common	 sense	 nonetheless	 strongly	 suggests	 that	 economic	 mea-
sures	should	be	used	to	support	government	legitimacy	and	security.	But	
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will	 not	 feel	 the	 positive	 effective	 of	 economic	 transformation	 until	 the	
economy	starts	to	create	wealth	on	the	microeconomic	front.	This	can	be	
done	by	 implementing	 labor-intensive	public	works	programs;	 enrolling	










viders—commercial	 banks,	 micro-finance	 institutions,	 local	 consulting	
firms,	 and	 non-governmental	 organizations—rather	 than	 through	 new	
service	delivery	entities	will	build	up	functioning	markets.”	Making	the	


























The Role of Reconciliation
Success	in	irregular	conflict	normally	will	require	persuading	not	only	












some	of	 the	opposition	to	end	resistance	 if	 for	no	other	 reason	than	to	
































Successful	 reconciliation	will	 require	 governance,	 security,	 and	 eco-
nomic	 efforts.	 In	 the	 governance	 arena,	 the	 very	design	of	 government	
could	be	critical.	Ensuring	executive	and/or	legislative	representation	for	




situation—and,	 over	 time,	 as	 trust	 builds,	 a	more	 efficient	 governance	
structure	might	be	able	to	be	built.














of	 a	 negotiated	 peace	 agreement.	DDR	programs	 have	 been	 a	 compo-





















cause	outcomes	 to	flow	across	all	 four	areas	 simultaneously.	Unless	we	 fully	
understand	the	ways	in	which	activities	and	decisions	in	one	area	influence,	
and	are	 influenced	by,	 those	 in	the	others,	we	run	the	risk	of	building	pro-
grams	that	are	internally	inconsistent	and	fundamentally	flawed.	Alternatively,	
if	 we	 can	 develop	 an	 adequate	 understanding	 of	 the	 relationships	 between	
and	 among	 the	 areas,	we	 can	 sequence	 and	 prioritize	 activities	 to	 optimize	
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the	early	 stages	of	 intervention	can	undermine	stability	and	contribute	 to	a	
resumption	of	irregular	conflict.	Lack	of	immediate	employment	opportuni-
ties	for	former	combatants	could	seriously	undermine	disarmament,	demobi-





















Inspector	General	 for	 Iraq	Reconstruction	 has	 set	 forth	 in	 detail	 the	 prob-
lems	created	by	deficient	organizational	structure	in	his	recent	analysis.30	He	


















eas	 secure	 from	 organized	 violence	 on	 a	military	 scale	 becomes	 the	 critical	
enabling	 step	 for	 subsequent	 strategies	 to	control	 and	 resolve	 irregular	 con-
flict.	Non-permissive	environments	impede	and	could	physically	prevent	the	























host	nation	policing	 and	 justice	 services	 to	 local	 communities	provides	 im-
mediate	 and	 compelling	 evidence	 of	 government	 functionality	 and	 directly	
enhances	the	legitimacy	of	host	nation	government	authorities.	Provision	of	
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of	national	power”—but	there	is	no	organization	that	effectively	brings	those	
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INTRODUCTION TO SECTION ONE
Rebuilding Governance in  
Response to Irregular Conflict
By Susan Merrill, PKSOI
“Nothing is harder to manage, more risky in the undertaking, or more doubtful of 
success than to set up as the introducer of a new order….”1
The	following	introduction	provides	a	short	synopsis	of	discussions	at	the	
Governance	Workshop	on	October	28,	2008,	and	of	discussions	concerning	
that	topic	at	the	subsequent	conference	on	Building Capacity in Stability Oper-
ations	held	on	April	6,	2009.	Following	the	introduction,	Chapters	2	through	







	 ·	 	Respond to its citizens,	submitting	to	the	will	of	the	people,	espe-
cially	when	people	vote	to	change	their	government;
	 ·	 	Exercise effective sovereignty,	maintaining	order	within	its	own	bor-
ders,	protecting	independent	and	impartial	systems	of	justice,	punish-
ing	crime,	embracing	the	rule	of	law,	and	resisting	corruption;	and
	 ·	 	Limit the reach of government,	protecting	the	 institutions	of	civil	












that	 countries	 emerging	 from	 civil	 conflict	 face	 a	 44%	 risk	 of	 returning	 to	
conflict	within	five	years.2	The	principal	reason	for	the	resurgence	of	violence	
INTRODUCTION TO SECTION 1
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The	 subsequent	 chapters	 explore	 each	 of	 these	 areas	 in	 greater	 detail.	
Derick	Brinkerhoff	 explores	 the	 role	 of	 governance	 in	 transition	 from	 sta-
bilization	 to	 reconstruction	 in	 fragile	 and	 post-conflict	 states.	Continuing	










the	 intersection	 between	 governance,	 peacekeeping,	 and	 peace-building	 in	
conflict	and	post-conflict	countries.	
INTRODUCTION TO SECTION 1






the	 state	model	 to	be	 employed.	 In	 this	 context,	 governance	planners	must	
address	 the	 sequencing	 and	 prioritization	 of	 national,	 provincial,	 and	 local	
government	rebuilding	efforts.	Strengthening	government	at	each	of	these	lev-
els	presents	unique	characteristics	and	challenges,	 including	establishing	the	




tioning	 institutions	defines	 the	 challenges	 facing	 the	 restoration	of	 govern-





Discussions	 addressed	 the	 issue	 of	 how	 the	 international	 community	
















construction,	 success	 in	 this	endeavor	requires	a	coherent	 strategic	vision	at	
the	 leadership	 level.	 It	 also	will	 require	 an	 expanded	 civilian	 expeditionary	
capability	 to	 complement	 the	military	 effort,	 encompassing	 all	 elements	 of	
national	power.
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CHAPTER 2 
Building Resilience in Fragile 
States: The Role of Governance 
By Derick W. Brinkerhoff
Distinguished Fellow in International Public Management
RTI International
Peacekeepers	 involved	 in	 stability	 operations	 in	 fragile,	 post-conflict	
states	recognize	that	the	transition	from	stabilization	to	reconstruction	to	lay	


















ordinator	 for	 Reconstruction	 and	 Stabilization	 treats	 restoring	 governance	
as	 one	 category	 of	 stability	 operations	 tasks,	 among	 several.	However,	 the	
perspective	of	this	paper	is	that	governance	constitutes	an	integrative	set	of	
tasks,	which	crosscuts	all	elements	of	stability	operations.	Thus,	the	underly-
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Rebuilding	 governance,	 then,	 concerns	 restoring—or	 in	 many	 fragile,	
post-conflict	states	creating	from	scratch—a	governance	system	that	can	ful-
fill	these	three	core	functions	in	ways	that	meet	citizens’	expectations.	How	









porting	 throughout	 the	 developing	 world	 for	 several	 decades	 (Brinkerhoff	
2008b).	This	agenda	combines	the	following:	
·	Improving administrative efficiency	through	management	reforms.	
·	 	Streamlining the role of government,	reducing	its	involvement	in	di-
rect	 service	 delivery	 and	 getting	 it	 to	 focus	 on	policy,	 financing,	 and	
regulation	 (that	 is,	 getting	government	 to	do	 less	 “rowing”	and	more	
“steering”).	















	 	 ·	 	State capacity	to	provide	services	within	a	secure	environment,	and	
to	obtain	 sufficient	 resources	 from	 its	 population	 and	 territory	 to	
provide	these	services.	
	 	 ·	 	Political will	 to	 direct	 resources	 and	 capacity	 to	 meet	 citizens’	
expectations.











tion	 patterns	 are	 largely	 negative.	The	 state,	 captured	 by	 elites,	 preys	 upon	

















































·	 	Politics and power:	Community	empowerment,	civil	society	strength-
ening,	political	party	development.	
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conflict	 situations,	 context	 is	 also	 set	by	 the	peace	agreement,	which	often	
establishes	key	features	of	governance	restoration:	e.g.,	power-sharing	among	

















demonstrating	 leadership.	The	 utilization	 of	 stability	 operations	 resources	
should	contribute	as	much	as	possible	to	establishing	good	governance	prac-
tices	and	building	government	capacity.	For	example,	U.S.	Army	peacekeep-
ers	 should	avoid	 simply	allocating	CERP	 funds	 in	 response	 to	what	 seems	







·	 	Build on local capacity and	engage	local	actors	in	governance	recon-
struction.	
·	 	Foster accountability	 and	 transparency	 to	 reduce	 corruption	 and	
build	citizen	support.	
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Figure 2. Capacity Development Model 
These	targets	are	distinguished	in	the	figure	to	highlight	their	relationship	





·	 	Moving along the horizontal axis	graphically	shows	how	the	time	re-
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nance in Post-Conflict Societies: Rebuilding Fragile States,	edited	by	Derick	W.	Brinkerhoff,	1-22.	
London:	Routledge.	
––––––––––
Grindle,	Merilee	S.	2007.	“Good	Enough	Governance	Revisited.”	Development Policy Review 
25(5):	553-574.	
––––––––––













·	 	Build new, positive relationships	between	citizens	and	public	officials	
around	key	service	delivery	issues.	
·	 	Pay attention to building legitimacy	when	 introducing	new	gover-
nance	structures.	
·	 	Recognize that governance transformation	 is	 a	 long-term	 process	
that	will	extend	beyond	a	given	stability	operation.	
Conclusion 


















50 CIVIL POWER IN IRREGULAR CONFLICT 51
SECTION 1/CHAPTER 3
CHAPTER 3
Interim Governments in  
Theory and Practice After  
Protracted Conflict
By Professor Karen Guttieri




ics	of	authority	 transitions—ostensibly	an	 internal	 sovereign	concern—have	
become	an	international	preoccupation.	Practitioners	from	outside	war-torn	
societies	 broker	 constitutional	 arrangements,	 provide	military	 and	police	 to	
sustain	order	 and	enforce	 laws,	 and	 fashion	aid	programs	 in	order	 to	move	






















settle	a	 social	process:	 the	collective	determination	of	 the	 right	 to	 rule,	 also	
called	the	determination	of	legitimacy.	
SECTION 1/CHAPTER 3





Piombo,	and	published	in	the	2008	volume,	Interim Governments as	follows: 
A Typology of Interim Government8
Revolutionary	regimes	enjoy	popularity,	but	have	little	connectivity	to	es-
tablished	structures	and	a	tendency	to	turn	violent	as	agendas	compete	and	







it	does,	creating,	as	 initially	 in	Bosnia,	an	awkward	administrative	 structure	
divided	along	civilian	and	military	lines	of	operations.	In	Kosovo,	the	author-
ity	structure	was	more	stable,	but	created	a	long-term	dependency.	
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CHAPTER 4
Centralized and Decentralized  
Governance Options After  
Protracted Conflict
By Karin von Hippel, 




first,	 it	outlines	 the	 risks	 and	opportunities	of	 the	different	 approaches	 and	
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The	second	is	a	 federation,	an	association	of	states	that	agree	to	



















ciples	 do	not	 require	 the	 state	 to	be	divided	 territorially	 into	 separate	
local	units.	Consociational	governments	normally	have	four	key	features:	
executive	 power-sharing;	 the	 principle	 of	 proportional	 representation	











































throughout	 the	 conflict.	 Aid	 delivered	 only	 through	 the	 center	 also	
tends	to	empower	the	elites,	while	marginalizing	rural	communities,	




























































or	 regional	or	 even	 locally	 elected	authorities,	 such	 support	 can	 risk	
undermining	 the	national	government,	 as	 it	 empowers	others	 at	 the	
expense	of	elected	authorities.	












• Centralization in Afghanistan?
The	Afghan	 government,	which	 emerged	 after	 the	Bonn	Agree-
ment,	was	a	centralized,	unitary	state,	not	one	of	the	four	decentral-
ized	models.	This	was	viewed	as	important	after	decades	of	civil	war,	
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to	promote	 the	building-block	 approach,	which	 also	 found	 resonance	
among	western	states	and	the	United	Nations.	Egypt,	on	the	other	hand,	










































could	 only	 be	 realized	 if	 it	were	 built	 on	 relatively	 strong,	 peaceful,	
decentralized	regional	foundations.
By	 the	 late	 1990s,	 the	 building-block/peace	 dividend	 approach	
had	 been	 endorsed	 by	 the	 Inter-Governmental	 Authority	 on	Devel-
opment	 (IGAD),	 the	 East	 African	 regional	 organization,	 which	 was	
chaired	at	the	time	by	Ethiopia.	Somaliland	was	already	receiving	the	









remained	 diffuse.	 Although	 in	 theory	 this	 approach	made	 the	most	
sense,	 and	 complied	with	what	many	 Somalis	 from	 all	 political	 and	
social	affiliations	had	been	advocating	for	years,	in	practice	it	was	un-
dermined	 by	 the	 relative	 indifference	 of	 some	 of	 the	major	 powers,	
particularly	the	United	States	and	U.N.	headquarters,	and	the	direct	
interference	of	the	neighboring	states.20	





















Rebuilding	 states	 and	 government	 capacity	 after	 protracted	 conflict	 is	
extremely	challenging.	Wars	almost	always	result	in	the	destruction	of	most	
existing	infrastructure	and	cause	the	majority	of	educated	citizens	to	flee	the	
country.	Even	 in	 the	 best	 circumstances,	when	 a	 constitutional	 design	has	
been	 agreed	upon,	 implementation	will	 be	 fraught	with	difficulties.	 It	will	
require	 sustained	attention	to	detail	and	frequent	 interventions	by	external	





In	 terms	 of	 the	 strategic	 design	 of	 a	 new	 government	 as	 part	 of	 the	
peace	 process,	 this	 should	 be	 led	 by	 national	 actors,	 with	 the	 support	 and	
technical	 assistance	 of	 the	 international	 community	 when	 requested	 and	
required.	The	 challenge	 for	 those	 who	 are	 seeking	 new	 decentralized	 politi-
cal	 structures	 for	 their	 country	 is	how	 to	develop	 an	over-arching	 framework	
capable	 of	 providing	 basic	 common	 services,	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 is	 se-












from	several	Gulf	 and	North	African	 states,	 including	Saudi	Arabia,	





gional]	 authorities,	 and	aimed	 instead	at	 the	 formation	of	a	govern-
ment	by	a	large	group	of	handpicked	individuals,	invited	by	the	Dji-
boutian	government.	Since	the	leaders	of	the	building	blocks	declined	










name	 only.	The	TFG	has	 never	managed	 to	 control	more	 than	half	 of	
Mogadishu	 and	parts	of	Baidoa,	while	 competing	groups	have	 vied	 for	
power.	The	most	successful	was	the	Islamic	Courts	Union,	which	was	per-
ceived	as	a	radical	fundamentalist	movement	that	threatened	Ethiopia	and	
allegedly	was	 linked	 to	Al-Qaeda.	 In	mid-2006,	 the	 ICU	 succeeded	 in	
consolidating	its	power	over	much	of	southern	Somalia.	Six	months	later,	
in	December	2006,	Ethiopia	invaded	Somalia	with	tacit	U.S.	government	
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CHAPTER 5
Achieving Effective Local  
Governance: A Perspective  
From the Field
By Colonel Richard Megahan, PKSOI
“Since an insurgency is a bottom-to-top movement, an administrative vacuum at 
the bottom, an incompetent bureaucracy plays into the hands of the insurgent.”
David	Galula23
“We had done our best to provide advice and support to our counterparts, but I 



























































































































vincial	 industrial	 production.	 Infrastructure	 security	 concerns,	 law	 enforce-
ment	 issues,	 elections,	 provincial	 finances,	 payroll	 of	 the	 government	 staff,	
provincial-national	government	control	and	responsibility	disagreements,	and	
provincial	capital	sewage,	water,	electricity,	telecommunications,	and	transpor-































withstand	 and	ultimately	overcome”	 the	Malayan	Communist	Party.	 In	his	
actions,	he	built	upon	the	blueprint	of	his	predecessor	to	integrate	civil,	po-
lice,	and	army	resources	at	all	levels.35	Templer	worked	to	improve	governance	
through	 increased	 Federation	 of	Malaya	 lower-tier	 governmental	 leader	 ca-
pability	in	activities	such	as	“parish-pump”	political	entities	known	as	Local	
Councils.36
Guiding Leadership and Capability-Building: The Framework of  
Stability Operations
Field	Marshal	Sir	Gerald	Templer’s	methodology	in	Malaya,	and	my	own	







row,	 sectarian	 self-interests	 and	 behave	 in	 a	way	 that	 ultimately	 serves	 “the	
common	good.”30	Citizens	 are	hardly	 interested	 in	 taking	 such	 steps	unless	
local	leaders	are	in	place	to	make	the	first	moves,	especially	in	the	midst	of	a	
robust	insurgency.
The Critical Nature of a Province-Focused Approach
Establishing	firm,	 responsible,	and	 lasting	national	governance	 is	an	es-

























orative	 and	 cooperative	 behavior	 developmental	 change,	 instead	 defaulting	
to	 superior-subordinate	 style	 relationships.	 It	 is	 very	 important	 that	we	 are	
continuously	reminded	that	the	effects	of	multicultural	exchange	move	along	
a	two-way	street.
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·	 	Building trust:	Requires	establishing	 in-depth	personal	 relationships	












·	 	Transformation by their own hands:	Re-engineering,	 restructuring,	




·	 	Shaping cultural change-carefully:	Through	coaching,	communica-
tion,	coordination,	and	commitment.	This	is	a	full-time	job.
·	 	Transition as endstate:	Capabilities	 and	 capacity-building	 first,	 fol-
lowed	by	capacity-enhancement,	for	assumption	of	full	responsibility	
for	governance.



















































·	 	“External aid” approach:	PRT,	Brigade	Combat	Team,	military	and	
police	advisors	must	be	synchronized	and	integrated	in	a	scheme	that	
supports	collaboratively	the	host-nation	governance	activities.
·	 	Service delivery:	 Service	 for	 and	 to	 the	 people-focus	 developmental	
change	activities	on	human	factors	first	to	facilitate	legitimacy-building.




















or	designing	 and	building	 the	 factory	 for	 the	 local	 government.	Of	 course,	
much	of	 this	 behavior	was	 a	 function	of	 a	 short-range	 view:	unit	 rotations	
lasted	one	year,	and	there	was	much	to	be	done	to	demonstrate	success;	each	
problem	set	seemed	unique,	regardless	of	previous	unit	experiences.	
Often,	 the	 approach	 taken	 served	 to	 usurp	 local	 leader	 authority,	 and	
derailed	 the	prospects	of	 enduring	 achievements.	Our	 tasks	were	 to	 change	
the	Iraqi	culture	to	fit	new	governance	circumstances—the	culture	that	didn’t	
change	to	account	for	the	integration	of	all	interagency	partners,	was	ours.






	 	 ·	Host Nation First.
	 	 ·	Empowerment.
	 	 ·	Enabling.
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CHAPTER 6
Peacekeeping Operations and  
Social Reconciliation: 
The Challenges of Effective  
Peace Building
By Richard McCall 












develop	different	 analytical	 tools	 and	 frameworks	 that	 are	 essential	 compo-
























but	 between	 systems	 of	 governance	 that	 are	 locally	 rooted	 and,	 into	 turn,	
















































and	 health	 committees,	 agricultural	 and	 marketing	 cooperatives,	 or	 water	
boards,	 just	 to	name	 a	 few	 examples.	 Institutions	 reflect	 the	 accepted	 rules	
of	the	game,	clearly	defining	individual	rights	and	responsibilities	within	the	
broader	community	of	interests.
Violent	 conflict	generally	breaks	out	 in	a	 society	when	 the	 fundamental	














·	 	Healthy states are multi-constitutional,	having	multiple	points	of	po-
litical	access	to	address	and	solve	problems.
·	 	Effective long-term problem-solving	needs	to	occur	at	multiple	levels	
and	focus	on	building	political	solutions	from	solid	social	and	economic	
foundations.
·	 	A strong and active citizenry	to	design	local	institutions	and	co-pro-
duce	public	goods	and	services.
·	 	A commitment	 to	dialogue,	participation,	 competition	 and	 compro-
mise	from	the	local	to	national	level.














goal	 was	 community	 ownership	 of	 the	 rehabilitation	 process.	 Self-selected	
















continue	 the	 engagement	 and	ownership	of	 the	 local	 school	 system.	A	 rec-
ommendation	was	made	to	the	USG	that	to	address	this	issue	some	form	of	
school	boards	and	Parent	Teacher	Associations	should	be	created	to	sustain	the	
neighborhood	 involvement	 in	 controlling	 their	 schools.	That	 recommenda-
tion	was	not	accepted,	and	a	significant	opportunity	was	missed	to	strengthen	
further,	 and	 to	utilize	more	effectively,	 the	 social	 capital	 that	existed	within	
Iraqi	society.













flict	 societies,	 the	 paper	 cited	Roland	Paris’	 book,	 “At	War’s	 End:	Building	










·	 	“Donors	 channel	 their	 support	 in	 the	 form	 of	 time-bound	 projects	
without	 a	 strategic	 framework	 and	 long-term	 commitment	 to	 peace	
building.
·	 	Despite	 lip	 service	 paid	 to	 local	 ownership,	 there	 is	 a	 disconnect	 be-
tween	external	priorities	and	national	processes	and	priorities.
























Since	 the	 end	 to	 the	 Cold	War,	 succeeding	 U.S.	 administrations	 have	
struggled	with	 the	 challenges	 posed	 by	what	 can	 be	 described	 as	 the	 new-
world	disorder.	We	have	struggled	with	the	need	to	reconcile	the	mandates	of	



















mobilization	 focused	 on	 engaging	 and	 strengthening	 civil	 society	 organiza-




































profitability,	 individual	members	 understood	 that	 for	 them	 to	 succeed,	 the	




income	 to	meet	 the	basic	needs	of	 their	 families.	They	now	had	a	 future	of	
possibilities	never	realized	before.	For	the	Hutu	women,	many	of	whom	had	
male	relatives	involved	in	the	Interahamwe	and	ex-FAR	raids,	their	future	was	



























von	Hippel, A Study of Decentralised Political Structures for Somalia: A Menu of Options,	Lon-
don	School	of	Economics,	EC	Somalia	Unit	and	the	UN	Development	Office	for	Somalia,	
August	1995	(published	in	English	and	Somali).
17	 	See	Barnett	Rubin,	The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the 
International System,	Yale	University	Press,	2002.
18	 	See	 Clare	 Lockhart,	 “The	 Aid	 Relationship	 in	 Afghanistan:	 Struggling	 for	 Government	




20	 	See	Karin	 von	Hippel,	 “Blurring	 of	Mandates	 in	 Somalia”,	 in	 Larry	Minear	 and	Hazel	
Smith,	eds.,	Humanitarian Diplomacy: Practitioners and Their Craft,	United	Nations	Uni-
versity	Press,	2006.
21	 	Matt	Bryden,	“No	Quick	Fixes:	Coming	to	Terms	with	Terrorism,	Islam	and	Statelessness	

















and	 local	ownership	 is	 a	 fundamental	 element	of	 the	USG	or	 international	



























8	 	Guttieri,	K.	 and	 J.	Piombo,	Eds.	 (2008).	 Interim	Governments:	 Institutional	Bridges	 to	
Peace	and	Democracy?	Washington,	D.C.,	U.S.	Institute	of	Peace	Press.	
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	 	 	 ·	 Stability	Operations:	subsystems	comprising	a	major	system.
	 	 	 ·	 	Security	first—this	facilitates	all	other	stability	operations	“sectors,”	orienting	on	
transition.
	 	 	 ·	 Systems	Theory	Approach:	complex	system	dynamics	interact-no	stove-pipes.
	 	 	 ·	 Changes	in	one	subsystem	affects	other	units	of	the	system.
	 	 	 ·	 Characteristics	of	one	subsystem	will	affect	other	elements	of	the	system.
















in	 the	body	of	 literature	 that	 is	better	at	describing	 the	cultural	 relativism	so	 imperative	






40	 	Edward	 L.	 Gibson,	 Subnational	 Authoritarianism	 and	Territorial	 Politics:	 Charting	 the	

































































32	 	Geert	Hofstede	 and	Gert	Hofstede,	Cultures	 and	Organizations:	 Software	 of	 the	Mind,	
New	York:	McGraw-Hill	(2005),	358.	Consider	the	following	points	on	complex	systems	
and	the	role	of	interactions	in	stability	operations:
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The Role of Security Sector Reform 
in Responding to Irregular Conflict




ity in Stability Operations	held	on	April	6,	2009.	Following	the	introduction,	
Chapters	7	through	13	reproduce	papers	submitted	in	support	of	the	Work-
shop	and	Conference,	which	furnished	the	basis	for	the	discussions	of	SSR.	









justice	 components	 of	 SSR,	 the	 role	 of	non-state	 security	 actors	 in	SSR	ac-
tivities,	and	the	rule	of	law	frameworks	that	underpin	SSR	programs	and	the	
security	sector	in	general.	Workshop	discussions	noted	the	serious	and	ongo-
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oping	 a	 host-nation	 stability	 policing	 capability,	 could	 help	 to	 address	 this	
problem.	An	alternative	approach	is	partnering	police	elements	with	external	
or	host-nation	military	forces	where	threat	levels	are	high.
Discussions	of	 police	 capacity	building	 emphasized	 that	 training	 is	 not	
enough.	Building	effective	police	 forces	 requires	 the	 strengthening	of	police	
institutions	at	all	levels.	SSR	needs	to	focus	on	improving	police	management	










tice	 functional	 areas.	The	paper	by	Eric	Beinhart	offers	 a	 case	 study	of	 just	
such	an	integrated	approach	in	Northern	Uganda,	and	illustrates	the	value	of	
interagency	partnerships	 among	key	SSR	 stakeholders	 like	 the	U.S.	Agency	






the	military	 and	defense	 communities.	Defense	Attache	offices,	military	 se-





















Part	of	building	 implementation	capacity	and	processes	 to	 support	 it	 is	
developing	an	effective	assessment	process	to	identify	needs	and	inform	SSR	




need	 to	 be	 fully	 supported	 and	 institutionalized,	 building	 a	 collaborative,	
whole-of-government	approach	into	the	assessment	process.
Discussions	at	both	the	SSR	Workshop	and	the	subsequent	conference	in	
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struction	 process.	Misconduct,	 human	 rights	 violations,	 criminal	 activities,	




































Local	 rule	of	 law	practices	and	structures	always	exist,	albeit	 sometimes	
in	uncodified,	 informal	 systems.	SSR	planners	will	need	 to	 identify,	 in	 col-






























ognize	 that	 initial	 rule	of	 law	frameworks	may	need	to	change	as	 transitions	
occur	in	the	process	of	restoring	or	strengthening	host	nation	governance.
96 CIVIL POWER IN IRREGULAR CONFLICT 97


























Achieving Immediate  
Developmental Change  
in Host nation Police
By Colonel Richard Megahan, PKSOI
Training indigenous security forces is also one of the most complex tasks in 
developing effective counterinsurgency strategy.…It is often even more difficult to 
take indigenous police and military forces with a tradition of incompetence and 
corruption and transform them into effective forces that can find and defeat in-
surgents without undermining the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the 
population.
James	S.	Corum1










Police	 serve	 as	 the	 cornerstone	 of	 host	 nation	 security	 sector	 forces	 in	
counterinsurgency	and	stability	operations.	The	police	act	as	both	facilitator	
and	 guarantor	 of	 progression	 to	more	 stable	 circumstances.	 Police	 capabil-




This	 paper	 addresses	 the	 imperative	 nature	 of	 capability	 and	 capacity	
building	of	indigenous	police	forces	during	stability	operations.	In	particular,	
it	is	crucial	that	leaders	of	police	forces	are	professionally	developed	through	
empowerment	 and	 enabling	 activities.	Advisors	 should	be	 assigned	 to	work	
with	police	 leaders	 at	 every	 level.	Legitimacy	of	police	 forces	 and	 leaders	 is	
promoted	initially	through	joint	U.S.	and	Host	nation	presence	patrols.	U.S.	
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Army	maneuver	formations	are	suitable	for	the	early	stages	of	police	leader	and	








Local	 “neighborhood	watch”	 or	 other	 informal	 irregular	 security	 forces	
must	be	incorporated	into	the	overall	security	apparatus	and	must	receive	ad-










Diyala Case Study: Background
The	situation	in	Diyala	Province	in	May,	2007	was	extraordinarily	volatile,	
complex,	fragile,	and	dangerous.	Al-Qaeda	insurgents	and	Shia	extremists	had	
succeeded	 in	 imposing	greater	 influence	over	 the	population	 throughout	 the	
region,	and	the	provincial	capital	had	already	been	proclaimed	as	the	“Islamic	

























tions	Command	was	 established	at	 the	Provincial	Government	Center,	 and	
steps	were	under	way	to	reinforce	the	U.S.	Provincial	Reconstruction	Team	to	
assist	Diyala	Governor	Ra’ad	in	Baqubah.	
While	 activities	 took	 place	 to	 address	 issues	 in	 the	 army	 and	 govern-
mental	spheres,	the	Provincial	Police,	on	the	other	hand,	did	not	receive	the	






Provincial	 police	 units	 were	 under-manned,	 under-armed,	 and	 inad-
equately	led.	Police	corruption	was	rampant,	and	sectarian	leanings	destroyed	
most	 of	 the	 remaining	 legitimacy.	 “Neighborhood	Watch/Concerned	Local	
Citizen”	elements	emerged	throughout	Baqubah	to	fulfill	the	most	basic	se-
curity	tasks	in	the	absence	of	bona	fide	police	units.	5th	Iraqi	Division	soldiers	













100 CIVIL POWER IN IRREGULAR CONFLICT 101










and	 there	was	open	hostility	exhibited	between	 the	Police	Director	and	 the	
leader	of	the	Sons	of	Iraq.	This	animosity	resulted	in	kidnappings,	murders,	





































observations	expressed	 in	 this	 section	of	 the	chapter	address	how	well	 these	
fundamentals	were	integrated	and	synchronized	within	the	overall	execution	
of	stability	operations.



























first.”	 The	 compendium	 of	 counterinsurgency	 case	 studies	 suggests	 very	
strongly	that	it	is	police	operations,	not	military	ones,	that	most	effectively	
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Along	 with	 the	 known	 difficulties	 of	 combating	 insurgents,	 organized	
crime	and	corruption	also	lurk	just	beneath	the	surface	of	day-to-day	civil	ac-
tivities,	but	 a	 comprehensive	 approach	 to	 stability	 and	 law	enforcement	be-
gins	with	 local	 policing.	 Issues	 of	Rule	 of	 Law	notwithstanding,	U.S.	 lead-
ers	recognized	the	police	as	an	essential	arm	of	counterinsurgency	operations,	
but	were	not	disposed	to	extend	manpower	resources	in	the	direction	of	local	













































local	 citizens.”	 It	 is	 essential,	 though,	 that	 the	provincial	government	deter-




While	this	 is	a	 topic	that	deserves	treatment	 in	a	separate	paper,	 suffice	
it	 to	 say	 that	 the	 temptation	 to	“assume”	 the	militias	 as	 a	military	 resource	




Iraqi	 police	 leadership,	 recruiting,	 organization,	 and	 employment	 in	Diyala	
Province,	 as	well	 as	distorting	 the	U.S.	 awareness	 of	police	 capabilities	 and	
capacity	in	the	counterinsurgency	campaign.
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even	 food	 and	water.	Consequently,	 the	 responsibility	 of	 securing	 the	 local	
areas	fell	not	to	the	constabulary	but	to	the	already	over-tasked	Iraqi	Army.
The	degree	 to	which	 insurgents	 are	 anxious	 to	 terrorize	 the	 police	 and	
cause	them	to	become	ineffective	in	their	security	and	intelligence	tasks	can	
be	seen	in	the	following	excerpt	from	Robert	Taber’s	War of the Flea.	In	this	












In	 the	 face	 of	 our	 strength	 and	 persistence	 and	 the	 trouble	 they	








Gain and Maintain Legitimacy
Host	nation	police	behavior	toward	the	citizens	they	are	chartered	to	pro-







tion	 of	 forthright	 leadership	 and	 transparent	 performance	 at	 every	 echelon	
of	police	command.	Legitimacy	comes	from	action,	from	performance,	from	





In	Diyala	Province,	 local	police	 initially	overcame	some	 issues	 in	 legiti-
macy	only	after	highly	visible	operations	were	conducted	with	the	Iraqi	Army.	
It	was	the	army,	not	the	police,	that	had	achieved	a	reputation	of	looking	out	
for	 the	 people,	 due	 to	 the	 active	 leadership,	 productivity	 of	 the	 command,	
conduct	of	the	troops,	and	humanitarian	assistance	extended	by	the	5th	Iraqi	















vincial	 government	 leader	 security	 details,	 and	 law	 enforcement	 tasks.	This	
caused	 a	 corollary	 effect	 of	 taking	more	 and	more	 soldiers	 away	 from	 the	









at	 the	 height	 of	 combat	 operations,	 the	Provincial	Director	 of	 Police	 often	
chose	 to	 disrupt,	 obstruct,	 or	 antagonize	 his	 superiors	 and	 contemporaries.	
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Much	 of	 the	misinformation	 and	misapplication	 of	 resources	 occurred	







of	 police	 commander;	 avoiding	 assumption	 that	HN	police	must	 be	 solely	
advised	by	U.S.	Military	Police;	observing	and	assisting	police	command	and	
control	systems;	supporting	baseline	law	enforcement	operations	such	as	pa-
trols,	 “Beat	Cop”	approaches,	 and	checkpoints;	monitoring	and	assisting	 in	
pay,	equipment,	training	systems;	recognizing	and	reporting	the	presence	of	
overt	 and	 covert	Sectarianism;	 and	 avoiding	 abuse	of	 special	 response	 force	
units	for	army-specific	tasks.	
Success	ultimately	depends	on	action,	but	 it	 is	 the	host	nation	govern-
ment’s	ability	to	recruit,	train,	organize,	and	employ	its	indigenous	police	ele-
ments	 that	ultimately	qualifies	 that	 success.	Success	 is	 facilitated	by	person-
to-person	advising	of	provincial	police	leaders,	a	requirement	that	cannot	be	
over-emphasized,	 since	 it	 is	 the	 development	 of	 police	 leaders	 that	 is	 vital.	
Improvement	of	police	leadership	must	occur	before	institutional	growth	and	
development	toward	full	capability	and	capacity	can	ever	take	place.	















The	mission	 is	 not	 about	 U.S.	 unilateral	 military	 operations,	 or	 U.S.-




reliability,	 capacity,	 and	 capability	 through	 empowerment	 and	 through	 the	
enabling	actions	of	advisors.	Transformative	actions	can	be	seen	as	a	four-point	
approach.
·	 	Position police advisor teams throughout the police chain of com-
mand.	It	is	essential	to	resource	advisors	for	the	provincial	director	of	
police	and	staff,	including	district	and	local	levels.	
·	 	Ensure “24/7” advising across the police chain of command.	This	
does	not	require	the	assumed	expertise	in	law	enforcement	of	a	Military	
Police	brigade,	but	is	a	task	completely	within	the	small	unit	leadership	





·	 	It is imperative to achieve a fused approach of advisor operations 
across all provincial institutions.	This	entails	synchronizing	activities	
of	 police	 advisors	with	 respective	 Iraqi	Army	 advisors	 and	Provincial	
Reconstruction	Teams,	urging	a	required	coordination	of	all	elements	of	
provincial	government	to	perform	stability	operations.
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the	principal	force,	the	army	as	the	supporting	force.	Observations	in	Iraq	sug-
gest	that	U.S.	military	leaders	are	uncomfortable	with	this	inverse	proportion.
























stability	 operations,	 getting	 the	 indigenous	 forces	 to	 “whitewash	 their	 own	
backyard	fence”	is	a	reasonable	and	desirable	solution.
Finally,	no	discussion	of	transition	and	transformation	of	indigenous	po-


















of	police	 forces.	Advising	 is	manpower-intensive,	but	 it	 facilitates	 the	













given	a	 fairly	permissive	 circumstance,	with	 re-deploying	 static	 traffic	
control	 checkpoints	 to	more	congested	areas,	or	 in	establishing	night	
patrols	or	guard	posts	of	key	infrastructure.	Again,	the	key	is	to	get	the	


















automatically	 equate	 to	one	effective	police	unit	 in	Afghanistan.	Leaders	of	
110 CIVIL POWER IN IRREGULAR CONFLICT 111








must	 initially	 orient	 on	 conducting	 operations	 to	 gain	 invaluable	 stability	
operations	 or	 counterinsurgency	 experience,	 develop	 some	 expertise	 among	









as	public	 servants,	with	a	duty	 to	all	of	 their	 fellow	countrymen,	 regardless	
of	religious	affiliation.	This	is	a	tall	order,	but	fundamental	to	the	long-term	
growth	of	police	institutions.
Development	 of	 police	 forces	 cannot	 be	 conducted	unilaterally	 or	 in	 a	
vacuum,	and	there	must	be	direct	interaction	with	the	other	sectors	of	stability	
operations.	 In	particular,	 the	presence	and	activities	of	 local	 “neighborhood	
watch”	or	other	informal	irregular	security	forces	must	be	incorporated	into	
the	overall	security	apparatus.	U.S.	commanders	must	be	creative	in	fielding	











into	 a	 coherent,	 integrated	provincial	 security	 reform	approach.	Otherwise,	
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CHAPTER 8
Piloting an Integrated Criminal  
Justice Development Project in  
Lira, Uganda
By Eric Beinhart


















Between	 1986	 and	 June	 2006,	when	 the	LRA	 and	 the	Government	 of	
Uganda	signed	a	cease-fire,	Northern	Uganda	did	not	have	a	functioning	statu-
tory	 legal	 system.	Soldiers	 from	the	Uganda	Peoples	Defense	Force	(UPDF)	







a	mass	migration	 from	the	 IDP	camps	back	 to	 their	homes.	The	GoU	and	
the	 international	donor	community	 focused	on	restoring	the	statutory	 legal	
system	in	the	north	to	provide	security	and	access	 to	 justice	 for	 the	return-
ees.	The	Uganda	Police	 Force	 (UPF)	 began	 hiring	 special	 police	 constables	
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holding	 community	meetings	 to	 understand	 citizens’	 concerns	 about	 crime	
and	security	issues.	Magistrates	were	faced	with	a	tremendous	case	backlog	in	
the	court	system.	












Community	 policing	 is	 a	 proactive	 process,	 while	 the	 investigation	 of	
crimes	 is	 a	 reactive	 one.	 For	 police	 agencies	 to	 be	 effective,	 both	 processes	
must	operate	effectively.	If	a	police	department	has	a	great	approach	to	com-
munity	policing	but	 lacks	 the	ability	 to	 investigate	crimes,	citizens	will	 lose	
confidence	in	the	police.	Conversely,	if	a	police	department	has	outstanding	
investigative	capabilities	but	makes	no	effort	to	work	or	engage	with	the	pub-










vention	will	 save	 police	 officers	 significant	 time	 they	would	 otherwise	 have	
wasted	writing	reports	on	the	case,	and	it	will	also	save	prosecutors	time	they	














rization	 to	 the	Department	 of	 Justice’s	 International	Criminal	 Investigative	
Training	Assistance	Program	(ICITAP)	to	implement	a	community-policing	
program	 in	 Northern	 Uganda.	 After	 conducting	 an	 assessment	 in	 March	
2007,	 ICITAP	and	USAID	concluded	 that	 it	would	be	more	 cost	 effective	
and	 sustainable	 to	 implement	 an	 Integrated	Criminal	 Justice	Development	
(ICJD)	pilot	project	in	Lira,	Uganda.	There	are	27	magisterial	areas	(locations	
with	magistrate	 courts)	 in	Uganda,	 and	 only	 five	 of	 them	 are	 in	Northern	
Uganda.	Thus,	if	the	pilot	project	proved	successful	 in	Lira,	similar	projects	
might	 be	 replicable	 in	Northern	Uganda’s	 other	 four	magisterial	 areas.	The	
goal	of	USAID	and	ICITAP	for	this	pilot	project	was	to	improve	the	efficiency	
of	Lira’s	criminal	justice	system	by	doing	the	following:
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tion	among	 the	different	 justice	actors	while	 improving	 their	 individual	ca-
pacities.	
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a	 legally	 sound	curriculum	that	would	help	constables	develop	viable	 cases.	
When	 ICITAP	 presented	 the	 training,	 the	 prosecutors	 and	 the	 magistrate	
taught	sections	regarding	evidence	and	court	procedure.	The	constables	asked	















































The	Chief	 of	Police	 in	Lira	Town	agreed	 that	 these	22	new	 instructors	
would	provide	 training	 to	other	police	members	 throughout	 the	entire	Lira	
District.	
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Lira District Criminal Justice Leadership Meetings 
On	August	16,	2007,	the	ICITAP	Program	Manager/police	advisor	and	










On	September	18,	2007,	 the	 ICITAP	Program	Manager/police	 advisor	













Lira Police Station Refurbishment and Equipment Donation
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The	magistrate	 said	 a	 juvenile	 justice	 system	had	been	 institutionalized	
because	of	the	spirit	of	cooperation	being	fostered	when	the	Chief	of	Police,	
the	State	Attorney,	 and	 the	Chief	Magistrate	 signed	 the	 ICITAP	 facilitated	



















by	 the	 police	 community	 liaison	 officers.	 A	 prosecutor	 in	 Lira	 believes	 the	

















plement	 a	 broader,	 national	 approach.	This	 is	 particularly	 true	 in	Uganda,	
where	there	is	a	strong	emphasis	on	providing	access	to	justice	for	all	citizens.	





When	 implementing	 ICJD	 in	 Uganda,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 target	 chief	























gram	 implementation	 whenever	 possible.	The	 U.N.’s	 presence	 in	 Northern	
Uganda	and	its	expertise	in	post-conflict	development	make	it	a	natural	partner.
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criminal	 justice	 systems	 in	 developing	 countries.	 It	 does,	 however,	 provide	
a	 useful	 laboratory	 for	 criminal	 justice	 reform	 in	which	 key	 principles	 and	
strategies	can	be	developed	and	implemented	at	 the	grass-roots	 level,	and	 if	
they	prove	successful,	the	lessons	learned	can	then	be	applied	to	national	level	
criminal	justice	systems.	
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CHAPTER 9
Rule of Law Lessons Learned












tions	 in	Iraq	and	Afghanistan,	and	 in	other	countries	with	U.S.	 rule	of	 law	
programs.	Participants	included	U.S.	Department	of	Justice	(DOJ)	assistant	







Rule of Law Activities: The Role of Assistant United States Attorneys
Since	2007,	rule	of	law	activities	in	Iraq	have	been	directed	primarily	by	
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as	 federal	prosecutors	was	critical	 to	establishing	 their	bona	fides	with	Iraqi	
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tant	at	 the	provincial	 level	and	below,	where	 rule	of	 law	 issues	extend	well	
beyond	criminal	prosecutions.	













U.S.	 military	 organizations	 were	 operating.	 All	 of	 the	 AUSAs	 interviewed	
commented	on	the	value	of	collaborating	with	their	SJA	counterparts.	
Operation	Hammurabi	 provides	 an	 excellent	 example	 of	military	 rule	









Rule of Law Activities: Conclusion
Programs	 focused	 on	 individual	 advising	 and	mentoring,	 like	 those	 de-
scribed	by	AUSA	 rule	 of	 law	 advisors	 in	 Iraq	 and	Afghanistan,	 are	 valuable	





of	 individual	host	nation	 justice	 system	officials	while	generating	 long-term,	
sustainable	improvements	in	host	nation	judicial	institutions	and	processes.	In	
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CHAPTER 10
The Role of Non-State Security  
Actors in Security Sector Reform:  
Hunting Societies in Sierra Leone
By Thomas Dempsey, PKSOI
Introduction

























with	 respect	 to	 non-state	 security	 actors.	 Although	ECOMOG	 forces	 real-
ized	some	significant	benefits	from	its	association	with	its	Kamajor	partners,	
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The	case	of	Sierra	Leone	demonstrates	that	non-state	security	actors	can	
play	a	critical	role	in	satisfying	local	security	needs	and	in	facilitating	the	op-
erations	 of	 intervening	 forces	 during	 the	 early	 stages	 of	 a	 peace	 or	 stability	
operation.	This	is	especially	true	when	military	forces	are	intervening	in	failed	
and	 collapsed	 states,	 or	 states	 with	 significant	 “ungoverned	 spaces.”	 At	 the	
same	time,	employment	of	non-state	security	actors	as	surrogates	for	state	or	










of	 the	 villages’	most	 experienced	 and	 successful	 hunters.	A	mature	member	















on	 security	 than	on	hunting.	This	 potential	was	 not	 lost	 on	 the	Freetown-
based	elites	struggling	for	power	in	the	post-independence	period.	As	conflict	
accelerated	 in	 the	1980’s,	 ethnically	based	political	parties	began	 exploiting	
the	hunting	societies	to	mobilize	support	and	enforce	their	agendas	in	their	
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ECOMOG	 commanders,	 lacking	 sufficient	 strength	 to	 occupy	 vast	
stretches	 of	 the	 Sierra	 Leone	 rain	 forest,	 turned	 to	 the	 hunting	 societies	 as	
means	of	compensating	for	both	lack	of	forces	and	for	ECOMOG’s	limited	
knowledge	of	the	operational	area.	The	hunting	societies	were	already	playing	













potential	obstacles	 to	movement,	 and	 indicated	areas	where	AFRC	or	RUF	
resistance	could	be	expected.	Kamajors	supported	ECOMOG	by	identifying	










ment.	 It	 became	 official	 policy	 as	 the	 ECOMOG	Force	 Commander,	 and	































provided	 some	 level	 of	 functionality	 in	 providing	 essential	 security	 services	
to	 local	 communities.	The	Kamajor	 role	 as	 communal	 hunters	 instilled	 an	
analog	for	a	tradition	of	public	service,	reinforcing	their	legitimacy	as	security	
providers	in	their	home	villages.	Hunters	were	skilled	in	the	use	of	traditional	
weapons;	 older	 and	more	 experienced	members	 of	 the	 societies	 possessed	 a	
limited	number	of	modern	hunting	rifles	and	shotguns,	and	were	proficient	in	
their	use.	Knowledge	of	the	environment	helped	the	hunting	societies	provide	





RUF	and	 rebel	 forces.	Kamajors	 in	 the	 south,	 for	 example,	manned	check-
points,	patrolled	roads	between	villages,	and	provided	an	armed	presence	in	
local	communities.	That	presence	acted	as	a	deterrent	to	marauding	bands	of	





peace	 enforcers	 were	 clearly	 evident	 to	 the	 tactical	 commanders	 directing	
ECOMOG	operations.	What	was	not	immediately	evident	were	the	negative	
consequences	of	that	partnership,	which	would	emerge	clearly	as	ECOMOG	
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nic	majority	 in	 the	 community.	Non-Mende	 villagers	 were	 understandably	
skeptical	that	Mende-speaking	Kamajors	would	act	to	protect	their	interests,	
especially	where	 those	 interests	were	challenged	by	Mende	neighbors.	Since	





As	ECOMOG	 forces	 facilitated	 the	deployment	 of	Kamajor	 and	other	
CDF	militias	 beyond	 their	 home	 villages,	 the	 limitations	 of	 those	militias	
became	more	 evident.	 Lacking	 detailed	 knowledge	 of	 local	 human	 terrain,	
the	CDF	default	was	to	 identify	civilians	of	other	ethnic	groups	as	RUF	or	
AFRC	sympathizers,	 if	not	actual	fighters.	Viewed	as	outsiders	by	 local	 res-
idents,	CDF	 forces	 accompanying	ECOMOG	 troops	 into	 unfamiliar	 areas	
were	treated	with	suspicion	and	frequently	with	hostility,	a	sentiment	that	the	
CDF	returned	in	kind.
The	CDFs	were	 typically	 not	 furnished	 regular	 salaries	 by	 their	 ECO-
MOG	sponsors	or,	subsequently,	by	the	restored	government	of	Tejan	Kabbah.	
In	 lieu	 of	 cash	 compensation,	 the	 hunting	 society	members	were	 generally	
provided	with	“assistance	in	kind”—food—on	an	intermittent	and	unreliable	
basis.	Lacking	adequate	 compensation,	 and	deployed	outside	of	 the	village-
based	traditional	structures	that	normally	supported,	and	were	supported	by,	













in	 a	 traditional	 rural	 society	where	modern	 educational	 opportunities	were	












with	 the	RUF,	and	 the	almost	pathologically	violent	behavior	of	 the	AFRC	
“sobels,”	had	already	created	an	environment	where	human	rights	were	rou-
tinely	violated	by	almost	all	sides.4	Casting	the	Kamajors	and	their	sister	CDF	




context,	 it	was	 not	 surprising	 that	 the	 hunting	 societies	 engaged	 in	 serious	
human	rights	violations.	
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Instances	of	misconduct	by	their	Kamajor	and	other	CDF	partners	badly	















Sierra	Leone	had	no	ECOMOG	presence	 at	 all,	 leaving	Kamajor	 bands	 to	
provide	 functional	 security	without	 any	 effective	 control	 or	 oversight	 from	
ECOMOG	officers.	
As	 ECOMOG	 sought	 to	 transfer	 authority	 to	 the	 reconstituted	 host	
nation	 government,	 the	 Kabbah	 administration	 was	 confronted	 with	 the	
Hobbesian	choice	of	either	endorsing	the	CDFs	as	security	providers,	or	ac-
knowledging	the	government’s	inability	to	provide	this	essential	public	service.	









It	 quickly	became	 evident	 that	Chief	Norman	had	 a	different	 agenda	 from	
that	of	 the	Kabbah	administration.	President	Kabbah	was	 forced	 to	dismiss	
Norman,	escalating	a	highly	public	and	politically	damaging	breach	with	the	
hunting	societies	at	a	critical	moment	in	the	transition	from	ECOMOG	to	
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CHAPTER 11
Non-State Actors and Security  
in Afghanistan
































had	fled	 the	city.	The	new	officials	owed	 their	 allegiance	 to	 friends	and	 the	
warlords	who	had	given	them	their	positions,	and	the	police	institution	as	such	
was	just	a	shattered	remnant	left	behind	by	the	various	political	tides	that	had	
144 CIVIL POWER IN IRREGULAR CONFLICT 145






































councils	 upheld	 the	Afghan	 version	of	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	 a	way	of	 looking	 at	
society	and	its	laws,	and	the	individual’s	position	in	the	social	structure,	which	
differed	 radically	 from	 the	west.	The	clergy	played	 an	 integral	 role,	directly	
deciding	questions	and	problems	at	 the	 immediate	 local	 level.	 In	cities	 and	
urban	areas,	small	neighborhood	meetings	of	a	few	trusted	elders	with	heavy	





















support	 for	dismantling	 the	Taliban	 regime.	They	 imported	 their	 system	of	
retainers	and	personal	security	entourages	with	them,	and	Afghan	leaders	and	
VIPs	were	immediately	recognizable	by	the	size	of	their	convoys,	and	by	the	








How Does All This Relate to Militias?
There	is	a	very	high	 level	of	personal	violence	 in	Afghanistan.	It	 targets	
officials	as	well	as	private	people,	and	is	indiscriminate	when	their	families	are	
present.	It	is	a	traditional	way	of	settling	personal	as	well	as	political	disputes.	
During	my	 four	years	 in	Afghanistan,	 I	personally	knew	more	 than	30	Af-
ghans	who	died	violent	deaths.	To	the	best	of	my	knowledge,	no	one	was	ever	
punished	 for	 these	deaths,	 including	the	assassinations	of	 the	 three	Cabinet	
members	and	the	Governor	I	knew.	
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that	 resembles	 remote	 parts	 of	medieval	 Europe	with	 its	 religious	 conserva-
tism,	armed	local	leaders,	fortified	compounds,	hereditary	estate	holdings,	and	












































changes	 in	popular	perception	that	will	only	occur	 if	 these	 institutions	per-
form	well.	
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Setting Rule of Law Priorities in 
the Early Days of an Intervention
By Frederick D. Barton, CSIS
Overview












that	 seem	impossible.	The	author	has	been	directly	 involved	 in	most	of	 the	
examples	cited	in	the	paper.
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ghanistan,	 and	Pakistan,	 chronic	weaknesses	 began	 to	 show	up	 in	 how	 the	
United	States	and	the	international	community	applied	its	models	and	efforts.	
It	became	clear	that	vital	steps	were	needed	in	order	to	succeed.	
The	 result	 has	 been	 the	Five	Principles	 of	 Success:	 anticipation,	under-
standing	of	context	and	analysis;	integrated	strategies	with	clear	priorities;	op-
erational	innovation	and	flexibility;	clear	measures	of	progress;	and	constant	
communications.	This	 section	will	 apply	 those	principles	 to	 the	 rule	of	 law	
question	through	a	series	of	brief	examples	and	broader	points.
Anticipation, Context and Analysis
The	human	condition	argues	against	great	preparation:	it	is	too	uncom-
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operative	model	should	be	water	polo	versus	the	neatness	of	a	swim	meet	or	
even	the	dynamic	of	a	relay	race.
Operational Flexibility and Innovation
The	fragility	of	 conflict	 settings	 and	 the	dynamics	 they	unleash	 require	
an	agility	that	is	not	often	found	in	government-style	programming.	With	its	
long	lead	times,	rigid	personnel	systems	and	formal	contracting	methods,	 it	







One	of	 the	best	examples	 for	overseeing	work	 in	distressed	settings	was	
provided	by	a	former	Deputy	High	Commissioner	of	UNHCR	and	later	As-









As	 the	United	States	prepared	 to	 invade	Haiti	 in	1994,	 there	was	great	
concern	about	the	Haitian	army	and	what	to	do	with	it.6	With	USAID’s	OTI	
in	the	lead,	it	was	decided	that	a	six-month	retraining	program	for	all	rank-
and-file	 soldiers	would	 be	 attempted.	Within	 a	 few	weeks	 of	 the	U.S.	 and	
allied	invasion,	Jacques	Lopatka,	a	dedicated	and	resolute	 international	civil	
servant	who	was	working	for	IOM,	proceeded	to	meet	with	almost	every	vo-













In	 Iraq	 in	 2003,	 a	 single	British	military	 officer	 took	 charge	 of	 the	 re-
newal	of	Basra’s	formal	justice	system.	With	spending	authority	in	the	range	
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One	response	was	to	show	substantive	progress	when	it	finally	appeared.	
As	the	trials	neared,	USAID’s	OTI	engaged	a	U.S.-based	non-governmental	


























Initiatives	 need	 to	 be	 started	 on	 both	 the	macro	 and	micro	 levels,	 but	
























When	U.S.	 reconstruction	 started	 in	2003,	 Iraqis	made	clear	 that	 their	
distrust	was	endemic	and	that	they	would	“only	believe	what	they	saw.”	It	was	
suggested	 to	 the	head	of	 the	Coalition	Provisional	Authority,	 Jerry	Bremer,	
that	hundreds	of	young	Iraqis	should	be	given	video	cameras	to	record	unfold-
ing	events	for	a	developing	television	market.	By	broadcasting	the	full	range	
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CHAPTER 13
Rule of Law and Detention  
Operations in Iraq
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expanded	facility	at	Camp	Bucca	vicinity	Basra,	Iraq.	Detention	Operations	
however,	were	still	viewed	as	a	liability	to	Coalition	Forces	and	in	response	to	









































their	detention.	The	question	 is	what	 to	do	with	 the	detainees	 and	how	 to	
re-integrate	them	back	into	society.
Detainees	must	 receive	humane	 treatment	until	properly	 released.	They	
also	must	be	provided	the	minimum	protection	of	the	Geneva	Conventions.	
They	may	not	be	transferred	to	the	host	nation,	or	any	foreign	government,	
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their	 families,	 and	with	detainees	who	have	previously	been	 released,	
build	 “social	 capital”	 within	 these	 groups;	 empower	 and	 embolden	
moderate	 former	 detainees	 to	 reject	 the	 conquering	 goals	 of	 political	









risk	 to	a	 strategic	advantage.	After	an	 intense	 in-depth	 study	of	mul-
tiple	groups	to	include	the	Multi-National	Corps-Iraq	(Combat	Force),	






Ultimate	 success	 in	prosecuting	 the	 counterinsurgency	 could	only	be	
achieved	by	establishing	an	alliance	with	moderate	Iraqis,	and	empower-
ing	those	moderates	to	marginalize	the	extremists.
·	 	Action: After	understanding	 the	battlefield	 and	what	was	needed	 to	
achieve	success,	the	Task	Force	began	developing	programs	to	change	
Detention	Operations	 from	 a	 strategic	 risk	 to	 a	 strategic	 advantage.	
The	means	of	doing	so	was	to	ally	with	moderates	in	detention—inside	
the	Theater	 Internment	Facilities—to	 empower	 them	 to	marginalize	
the	extremists.
Objectives of the New Detention Programs 
The	overarching	objective	 in	detention	operations	 is	 to	 ensure	 that	 ap-
propriate	 standards	 of	 “care	 and	 custody”	 are	maintained.	This	 overarching	
objective	can	be	divided	into	two	subordinate	objectives.	These	two	objectives	
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in	 the	 press.	Therefore,	 detention	 operations	must	 be	 transparent:	 interna-
































Building of a TIFRIC (Theater Internment Facility Reintegration Center)
Task	Force	134	realized	 that	 the	Theater	 Internment	Facility	 (TIF)	was	


































to	 include	education,	vocational	 training,	 civics	 courses,	 Islamic	discussion	
(hiring	moderate	Sunni	and	Shia	clerics	to	teach	the	Koran),	family	visitation	
(families	were	given	a	stipend	for	 their	expenses	based	on	UNHCR	costs),	
and	 pay	 for	 work	 programs.	These	 programs	 were	 designed	 to	 emphasize	
moderate	behavior	and	discourage	extremist	behavior.	
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with	ECOMOG	officers	 and	 soldiers,	 officials	 of	 the	 Sierra	Leone	Government,	 former	
AFRC	 rebels	 and	RUF	fighters,	 and	hunting	 society	members	 during	May	 and	 June	 of	
1998,	when	the	author	was	serving	as	U.S.	Defense	Attache	to	both	countries.
14	 David	Keen,	Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone,	New	York:	Palgrave,	2005,	pp.	132-133.
15	 	Lansana	Gberie,	A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone,	
Bloomington:	Indiana	University	Press,	2005,	pp.	82-84.
16	 	Amnesty	 International,	 Amnesty International Report 1999 - Sierra Leone,	 1	 Janu-
ary	 1999.	 Online.	 UNHCR	 Refworld,	 available	 at:	 http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/
docid/3ae6aa0938.html	[accessed	17	October	2008]
17	 	Gert	Jan	Hofstede,	Contributor	Gert	Jan	Hofstede,	Cultures and Organizations: Software of 
the Mind,	New	York:	McGraw-Hill	Professional,	2005.

















3	 	James	S.	Corum,	“Training	Indigenous	Forces”	in	Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgen-
cies,	Strategic	Studies	Institute,	U.S.	Army	War	College,	Carlisle,	PA	(March	2006),	v.
4	 	The	Provincial	Director	of	Police,	MG	Ghanem,	was	a	former	Iraqi	Army	flag	officer	from	





































9	 	James	S.	Corum,	Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgencies,	
Strategic	Studies	Institute,	U.S.	Army	War	College,	Carlisle,	PA	(March	2006),	vi.
10	 Ibid,	48.
11	 Robert	Taber,	War of the Flea,	New	York:	L.	Stuart	(1965),	123-124








170 CIVIL POWER IN IRREGULAR CONFLICT 171
INTRODUCTION TO SECTION 3
INTRODUCTION TO SECTION 3
The Economic Instrument in  
Irregular Conflict
By Joseph Gregoire, PKSOI
“Correct thinking leads to correct actions;  





























in	non-	or	 semi-permissive	environments	are	distinctly	different,	as	 to	 their	
priority	and	sequencing,	from	the	economic	initiatives	that	can	and	should	be	
pursued	 to	 promote	 sustainable	 economic	 growth	 in	 secure	 environments.	
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In	the	former	case,	the	rapid	synergistic	effect	of	economic	initiatives	on	the	





































build	 local	 allies	over	working	with	 the	government.	That	 is	 certainly	what	
happened	most	 recently	 in	Iraq.”	Similarly,	 to	create	 jobs,	“you	may	simply	
work	with	whatever	provides	jobs.	And	if	that	something	is	socialist,	you	may	






V.	L.	Elliott,	 an	 adjunct	 professor	 at	 the	National	Defense	 Intelligence	
College,	participated	in	the	April	6	conference	in	his	private	capacity.	Speaking	































bers	of	 civil	 society	organizations	who	empathize	with	 the	victims,	 and	 the	
officials	 and	donors	who	 function	at	higher	 levels	of	government	all	have	a	
stake	in	the	resolution	of	a	conflict.	The	stability	operators	must	work	with	all	
of	 them.	As	 they	pursue	 initiatives	 that	aim	to	restore	basic	 livelihoods	and	
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The	distinct	ways	 in	which	corruption	might	be	dealt	with	 in	 irregular	
conflict	and	under	conventional	aid	programs	throw	light	on	how	action	in	
the	first	setting	could	set	the	stage	for	action	in	the	second	setting,	even	if	the	
initial	 action	 is	 sub-optimal	 as	 perceived	 over	 a	 longer	 term.	Dealing	with	
powerful	 corrupt	 stakeholders	 in	 a	 conflict	 entails	 the	 risk	 of	 consolidating	
































regular	conflict	we	are	engaging	in	the	economics of muddling through,	in	envi-
INTRODUCTION TO SECTION 3
ronments	in	which	there	are	no	“neat,	clean-cut	solutions”	to	the	problems	at	
hand,	 in	 settings	 where	 we	 must	 often	 content	 ourselves	 with	 the	 ‘good	
enough.’	In	Mr.	Shaikh’s	own	words,	“it	has	to	be	‘good	enough’	in	ways	to	
materially	alter,	at	scale	patterns	of	violence,	resentment,	and	despair.	It	has	to	
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CHAPTER 14
Guide to Economic Growth in  
Post-Conflict Countries
By Dr. Jay Smith, USAID
Introduction
This	note	provides	a	summary	of	the	main	messages	concerning	post-con-
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Evidence	 shows	 that	 early	 attention	 to	 the	 fundamentals	 of	 economic	
growth	increases	the	likelihood	of	successfully	preventing	a	return	to	conflict	
and	moving	forward	with	renewed	growth.	Since	40	percent	of	the	post-con-
flict	 countries	 that	 Paul	Collier	 and	his	 colleagues	 have	 tracked	have	 fallen	
back	into	conflict	within	a	decade3,	it	is	critically	important	to	heed	this	evi-















violence.	Their	 problems	 have	 almost	 always	 been	made	worse	 by	 conflict.	
More	 importantly,	 the	nature	 of	many	of	 their	 problems	has	 also	 changed.	
Their	post-conflict	settings	are	characterized	by	physical	and	human	destruc-






cal	 considerations	 of	 economic	 efficiency	 and	 growth	 stimulation.	The	 pro-
SECTION 3/CHAPTER 14
grams	must	effectively	expand	the	opportunities	for	and	ensure	the	inclusive-
ness	 of	 the	 population.	They	 should	 also	 be	 judged	 in	 part	 on	 the	 basis	 of	
whether	or	not	they	help	mitigate	the	political	factors	that	increase	the	risk	of	a	
return	to	hostilities.	




















A pragmatic approach:	 At	 the	 core	 of	 all	 donor-supported	 economic	
growth	programs	must	be	a	highly	pragmatic	approach,	based	on	an	under-
standing	 of	 the	 critical	 barriers	 to	 resuming	 growth.	 Such	 an	 approach	 ad-
dresses	simple	issues	first,	removes	barriers	to	the	informal	sector,	and	is	struc-





through	 a	well-coordinated	process	 that	 integrates	multiple	donors	 and	 the	
host	government.	Donors	need	to	make	effective	coordination	mechanisms	a	
high	priority	from	the	beginning.
How Should It Be Done?
Donors	should	begin	work	in	multiple	areas	immediately	and	simultane-
ously,	and	begin	early	to	build	long-term	capacity.
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term	payoffs	 in	 terms	 of	 programming	 choices.	There	 are	 no	 hard-and-fast	
rules	about	these	trade-offs.	Judgment	must	be	applied	in	every	case.	
Establish priorities:	During	the	 immediate	post-conflict	period,	 there	
may	be	a	narrow	window	of	opportunity	to	introduce	difficult	economic	re-
forms.	There	 also	may	 be	 extreme	 limits	 on	 the	 government’s	 capacity	 to	
implement	change.	Often,	so	many	changes	are	needed	that	donors,	working	
with	the	host	country	government,	have	to	set	immediate	priorities	on	the	
basis	of	what	will	most	quickly	 and	most	 effectively	generate	 employment	
and	stimulate	the	economy.













contrasted	 with	 the	 very	 limited	 absorptive	 capacity	 of	
most	governments	to	manage	change.	
Pay attention to sequencing: The	termination	of	conflict	creates	an	im-
mediate	 rebound	 of	 economic	 activity,	 though	 typically	 not	 to	 pre-conflict	
levels.	Donor	and	government	consumption	of	local	goods	and	services	stimu-
lates	broader	economic	activity.	Job-creation	programs	generate	a	temporary	









































Post-Conflict: EG Program Emphases
Build Institutional Capacity
Provide Humanitarian Assistance
& Expand Physical Security
Undertake Policy & 
      Legal Reforms
Reconstruct Infrastructure
& Provide Public Services
Provide Jobs




prospect	 of	 growth	 through	 sustainable,	 productive,	 private-sector	 employ-
ment	displacing	the	short-term	donor	programs.	Keep	in	mind	that	the	pat-
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	Fiscal	Policy	and	Institutions		
	Monetary	Policy	and	Institutions	
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 Chapter VIII: 		Private-Sector	Development
Private-Sector	Enabling	Environment		
Enterprise	Development
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Overarching objective: Rein in inflation and preserve price stability
Because	 inflation—especially	 at	high	 rates—deters	business	 investment,	
erodes	the	value	of	family	savings,	and	can	weaken	or	stall	economic	recovery,	
a	 central	objective	of	fiscal,	monetary,	 and	exchange-rate	management	 is	 to	
rein	 in	 inflation	and	preserve	price	 stability.	Host	governments	must	 regain	





of	 creating	 new	 [monetary	 and	financial]	 institutions	 has	 turned	 out	 to	 be	
harder	and	more	time-consuming	than	expected.”5
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pacity-building	 assistance	 programs	 might	 best	 be	 introduced,	 in	 se-
quence	and	intensity,	over	the	post-conflict	transition	period.
Table V.1  Fiscal Policy and Institutions Priority and 
Sequencing of Assistance
Item Urgent Immediate Intermediate Consolidating
Expenditure control
Receipts management
Indirect (tariffs, excise, sales) 
tax control
Direct (income & payroll) tax 
control
Financial control over state-
owned enterprises
Fiscal policy planning & 
management cpacity
Reform of tax policy





No assistance  
during phase
B. Monetary Policy and Institutions 
It	 now	 is	 widely	 accepted	 that	 inflation,	 especially	 at	 high	 rates,	
deters	 business	 investment	 and	 weakens	 economic	 growth.	 In	 many	
post-conflict	 countries,	 one	 important	 early	 challenge	 is	 to	 overcome	
inflation	 (or	even	hyperinflation)	 to	preserve	price	 stability.	A	 second	













ments	 and	 the	 central	 bank	 to	 function	 effectively.	 In	 addition,	public	 and	
private	financial	institutions,	both	formal	and	informal,	must	be	able	to	service	





	 ·	 	Payment	mechanisms	or	efficient	accessible	means	 to	pay	 for	goods	



















central	banking	 responsibilities,	 including	 the	 licensing	and	 supervision	of	
commercial	banks.







































Table V.II  monetary policy and institutions Priority and  
Sequencing of Assistance
Item Urgent Immediate Intermediate Consolidating



















No assistance during 
phase
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CHAPTER 15
Toward Conflict-Sensitive  
Macroeconomic Growth:  
Unraveling Challenges  
for Practitioners




fortunately,	 relatively	 scant	 attention	 is	 paid	 to	 the	 circumstances	 in	 these	
countries	that	limit	the	effectiveness	of	traditional	approaches	to	macroeco-
nomic	reform.	Most	peace	agreements	and	economic	recovery	programs	ac-
knowledge	 the	 centrality	 of	 a	 robust	 macroeconomic	 framework	 in	 state-











been	 positively	 correlated	with	 improved	 living	 standards	 and	 employment	
creation.6	There	is	thus	an	urgent	need	for	an	approach	that	can	be	more	effec-
tive	in	these	states;	one	that	promotes	growth	while	being	sensitive	to	the	risks	
























harmful.	 Conflict-affected	 states	 generally	 pose	more	 difficult	 development	
challenges	than	do	countries	with	peculiar	circumstances	that	require	deeper	
analysis	and	more	nuanced	economic	reform	programs.




others	 do	 not.	Therefore,	 while	 macroeconomic	 recovery	 programs	 should	












and	policy	 incentives	without	 attention	being	paid	 to	 these	 special	 circum-
stances.	 Achieving	 and	 sustaining	 economic	 growth	 requires	 policy	 frame-
works	that	are	sensitive	to	the	reality	of	conflict-affected	economies.
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Fragmented Markets: Markets	 fragment	 during	 prolonged	 periods	 of	
conflict.	The	formal	or	official	market	is	weakened	by	corruption,	inefficiency,	
and	declining	revenue.	A	combination	of	mismanagement	and	wrong	policy	



















Most	of	 the	policy	 instruments	of	 traditional	macroeconomic	 strategies	
account	poorly	 for	 this	market	 fragmentation.	The	assumption	of	a	 formal-
informal	market	dichotomy	is	neither	accurate	nor	helpful.




tive,	 conflict-sensitive	 approaches	 should	make	 provision	 for	 spending	 and	
incentives	in	order	to	address	this	issue.	This	is	one	area	in	which	the	state	must	
become	an	active	agent	of	change	for	sustained	recovery.	







Accounting for Economic Causes of Conflict: Many	conflicts	are	either	
started	or	fueled	by	economic	factors,	and	the	key	actors	become	important	


























tors	 nor	 the	 institutions	 in	 these	 countries	 are	 likely	 to	 respond	 well	 to	
traditional	policy	prescriptions.	A	number	of	commentators	have,	therefore,	





political	disintegration.8	This	explains	why	 there	 is	 a	need	 for	an	approach	
that	is	conflict	sensitive.
What Is a Conflict-Sensitive Approach?






















triggering	or	 fueling	violence	 in	many	conflict-affected	 states.	Policy-makers	
must	be	mindful	of	this	when	designing	and	implementing	economic	growth	
policies.	In	many	cases,	economic	recovery	programs	focus	on	key	sectors	or	
industries—like	 oil	 in	 Iraq,	 rubber	 in	 Liberia,	 and	mining	 in	 Sierra	 Leone.	











investment	 in	 human	 capital	 and	 specific	 value-chain	 interventions,	 which	




rary,	 social	 safety-net	programs	and	creative	 taxation	policies.	Broader,	more	
effective	moderate	tax	regimes	are	generally	more	effective	than	ambitious	at-
tempts	at	redistribution.














economic	programs,	 and	by	 establishing	 regulatory	 and	 institutional	 frame-
works	that	foster	robust	entrepreneurship.
Long-Term Nature: Conventional	 macroeconomic	 recovery	 programs	







entrepreneurs,	 and	 laying	 the	 foundation	 for	 lasting	peace	 take	much	more	
time	than	the	traditional	programs	provide	for.	In	the	conflict-affected	states,	
macroeconomic	incentives	take	relatively	longer	to	work,	and	returns	on	pub-




Danger of Recidivism: A	 secure	 environment	 is	 a	 prerequisite	 for	 sus-
tained,	 equitable,	 and	 broad-based	 economic	 growth.	 In	 conflict-affected	




























Corruption and Impunity: Corruption	and	impunity	are	usually	endemic	
following	years	of	violent	conflict.	When	countries	tackle	corruption	and	im-
prove	their	rule	of	 law,	GDP	can	rise	by	as	much	as	 four	times	 in	the	 long	
term,	the	business	sector	can	grow	by	an	additional	three	percent	annually,	and	
child	mortality	can	fall	by	as	much	as	75	percent,	according	to	research	by	the	
World	Bank	 Institute.12	 Its	findings	 showed	 that	 corruption	hinders	 invest-
ment;	it	was	found	to	impose	a	20	percent	tax	on	foreign	investors.	Tackling	
corruption	 is	 especially	 difficult	 in	 conflict-affected	 countries,	 not	 only	 be-










enhancing)	 remain	 prominent	 in	 economic	 activity.	 Integrating	 informal	
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market	 structures	 requires	 much	 more	 than	 legislation.	 Formal	 channels	
should	be	made	more	accessible	to	and	affordable	for	the	nascent	business	sec-
tor.	Some	financial	 instruments	 should	be	 retooled	 to	 serve	 the	non-formal	
sector,	since	it	should	not	be	expected	or	required	that	all	economic	actors	will	
transact	business	through	commercial	banks.	Microfinance	institutions,	trade	
credits,	 and	extension	services	can	also	 facilitate	 the	 integration	of	 informal	
markets	in	the	formal	economy.		
Role of International Actors: Support	 from	international	partners	 (gov-




















·	  Macroeconomic End State: Sustained	 increases	 in	 productivity	 are	
essen	tial	and	fundamental,	but	must	be	complemented	by	strong	mea-








mo	date	 investment	 needs	 and	 job	 creation	 requirements	 in	 the	 early	
months	and	years.	The	trade-off	between	inflation	and	the	fiscal	deficit	
must	be	accommo	dated	in	the	early	years,	and	productivity	gains	in	the	
outer	 years	 should	 be	 programmed.	 Ambitious	medium-term	 targets	
(three	 to	 five	 years)	 should	 be	 avoided.	 Policy-makers	 should	 devote	
SECTION 3/CHAPTER 15
more	attention	to	managing	reserves	and	debt	than	inflation	targeting.	





·	 	Fiscal Policy: The	initial	task	should	be	to	improve	public	expenditure	
man	agement	 (the	 wage	 bill	 and	 procurement)	 and	 tax	 collection	 (by	
broad	en	ing	 the	 tax	 base	 and	 effective	 tax	 administration).	 Targeted	
growth-enhancing	spending—including	infrastructure	projects	and	so-
cial	 safety	nets—should	be	 implemented.	Monetized	financing	of	 the	
fiscal	deficit	should	be	replaced	by	open	market	operations	(i.e.,	the	pur-
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CHAPTER 16
Employment Generation in  
Post-Conflict Environments:  
Linking Short- and  
Long-Term Initiatives




long	 term.	Donors,	 practitioners,	 and	policy-makers	 agree	 that	 “sustainable	









Several	 types	of	responses	can	set	 the	course	 for	economic	stabilization.	
This	 paper	 focuses	 on	 employment	 generation	 immediately	 following	 pro-
tracted	conflict.	Our	purpose	is	to	illustrate	best	practices	to	create	jobs,	high-
lighting	the	importance	of	linking	short-term	efforts	that	seek	immediate	re-
sults	 with	 longer-term	 action,	 which	 sets	 a	 foundation	 for	 sustainable	











The	 long-term	outcome	of	 this	program	remains	uncertain	because	 the	 im-















tegration.22	 Compounding	 the	 threat	 of	 gangs	 and	 their	 illicit	 activity	 is	
growing	urbanization.	As	rural	areas	continue	to	offer	fewer	opportunities	for	
sustainable	livelihoods,	Haitians	are	flocking	to	urban	centers	and	overcrowd-





















longer-term	economic	growth.	Much	 literature	demonstrates	 the	 scarcity	of	
“concrete,	 applicable	 tools,	methodologies	 and	guidelines	 to	help	 relief	 and	
development	 practitioners	 design	 and	 implement	 interventions	 that	 build	






nomic	 response	 in	 conflict-affected	 environments	 is	 the	 understanding	 and	





























views	 of	 household	 economies,	 and	 a	 comprehensive	 look	 at	 industries	 and	
specific	value	chains	could	inform	opportunities	where	there	is	high	potential	
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Several	other	best	practices	
have	 been	 widely	 accepted	 by	
economic	 development	 practi-






such	 lessons,	 such	 as	 the	need	




buyers	 and	 demand	 trends,	








new	 ones	 between	 conflicting	 groups.	Multiple	 stakeholders	 (private	 sector,	
public	sector,	and	civil	society)	should	be	involved	at	various	levels	of	such	pro-
grams	to	ensure	transparent	and	inclusive	decision-making.	The	programs	must	
acknowledge	 the	 key	 change	 agents	within	 the	 economic	 sphere:	 those	who	
have	enough	influence	to	impact	change,	but	are	not	entrenched	in	the	status	
quo	or	have	an	economic	or	political	interest	in	instability.	Development	assis-















formal	private	 sectors,	and	the	 local	communities	 that	are	at	 the	core	of	 the	
program.	Together,	these	stakeholders	identify,	prioritize,	and	implement	job	








tified	 infrastructure	 projects;	 integrating	 local	 capacity	 building	 into	 project	




























Identifying Desired Outcomes of 
Stabilization Efforts
Understanding a country’s social, political, and 
economic context is an important first step in 
designing and implementing a post-conflict eco-
nomic recovery and stabilization program. A micro-
economic response may focus on one or several of 
the following desired outcomes:
 · Build economic stakes in stability:
  °  Generate trust/ faith in new 
political systems
  °  Stimulate productive activity among 
disaffected youth/ 
urban populations
  ° Reintegrate ex-combatants
 ·  Revitalize infrastructure supporting 
economic activity
 · Inject capital into economy
 ·  Create more favorable climate for 
investment
 ·  Restore livelihoods/ assets, particularly 
among vulnerable groups

















that	 identified	 labor	market	 trends	 and	 the	 specific	positions	 and	 skills	 re-
quired	 by	 employers	 in	 each	 of	 the	 geographic	 target	 areas;	 assessed	 the	
knowledge,	skills,	and	abilities	within	the	program’s	target	groups;	and	identi-
fied	 long-term	employment	opportunities	 that	might	ensure	a	 living	wage.	




	 •	 	Career	 development:	 Academic,	 vocational,	 and	 livelihood	 skills	
training;
	 •	 	Career	transition:	Eighty	percent	of	time	devoted	to	practical	work	and	










































KATA Challenges, Trade-offs, and Recommendations: After	encounter-
ing	obstacles,	the	KAPA	program	has	adapted	its	approach	to	maximize	opera-
tional	efficiency.	
A	major	 challenge	 had	 been	management	 of	 competing	 demands	 be-
tween	 realizing	 immediate	 outputs	 and	 long-term	 development	 objectives.	
KATA	is	meant	to	provide	immediate	short-term	livelihood	benefits	to	Hai-
tian	citizens;	however,	the	rush	to	implement	projects	in	the	first	few	months	
came	at	 the	expense	of	 setting	up	operating	 systems	 in	 synch	with	 longer-




















talized	 approach	 to	 short-term	 and	 long-term	 job	 creation	 since	 the	design	






Although	projects	 such	as	market	 access	 road	construction	corresponded	 to	
the	long-term	job	creation	goals	of	the	program,	the	projects	were	lower	prior-
ity	 than	other	projects	 that	 created	more	 short-term	employment.	As	other	
practitioners	have	noted,	CHF’s	experience	with	infrastructure	projects	con-
firms	a	 common	short-	 versus	 long-term	 trade-off	when	 implementing	em-
ployment	generation	programs:	
“Many	of	the	jobs	offered	through	transitional	employment	programs	are	

























such	 as	partnering	with	 a	non-governmental	organization	 like	CHF.	Since	
KATA	was	not	intended	as	a	private-sector	development	program,	per	se, and	
its	 activities	 were	 not	 originally	 structured	 to	 pay	 much	 attention	 to	 the	










2008	 caused	 delays.	These	 events	 resulted	 in	 a	 re-prioritization	 of	 program	
activities	that	did	not	match	the	KATA	program’s	initial	focus.	The	riots,	pro-




Looking	 forward,	KATA’s	 programming	 for	 its	 final	 two	 years	 calls	 for	
CHF	to	focus	less	on	the	creation	of	short-term	jobs	and	concurrently	to	in-
crease	 its	 long-term	 job-creation	 efforts.	The	partnerships	 that	 the	program	
staff	established	with	the	Haitian	private	sector	during	the	first	two	years	of	the	
program’s	implementation	are	expected	to	bear	fruit	in	the	form	of	long-term	
job	creation.	As	a	 result	of	CHF’s	extensive	experience	 implementing	 infra-
structure	projects	during	the	first	two	years,	CHF	has	a	well-oiled	system	in	
place	to	efficiently	and	effectively	implement	such	projects.	
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portant	 lesson	 is	 that	 in	 a	 conflict-affected	 environment,	 stability	 rests	not	







Local and Donor Obstacles to  
Restoring Public Administration 
Capacity in Post-Conflict Societies






















Whereas	 similar	 doubts	 generally	 plague	 all	 donor-funded	 rehabilitation	
and	reconstruction	efforts,	in	the	case	of	public	administration—the	essential	
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cal	 infrastructure	 of	 administration.	 This	 includes	 elements	 such	 as	 office	











































side	 expertise	 and	 resources	 long	 after	 the	 intervention	of	 the	 international	
community	can	realistically	be	expected	to	terminate.	Thus,	there	remains	a	
real	 danger	 that	 the	withdrawal	 of	 the	 international	 community’s	 resources	
could	 cause	 the	host	 country’s	 entire	public	 administration	 capacity	 to	 col-
lapse,	thereby	leaving	a	vacuum	of	political	authority	and	legitimacy	at	pre-
cisely	the	time	that	the	international	community’s	withdrawal	places	a	premi-
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significant	obstacles	is	that	the	short-term	technical	assistance	that	is	intended	
as	a	 stopgap	takes	on	a	 life	of	 its	own.	Long-term	capacity	development	 is	
then	sacrificed	to	short-term	efficiency	considerations.






























countries	 affected	by	 conflict,	handicaps	 that	 are	part	of	 the	nature	of	 the	
post-conflict	 environments	 and	 the	weak	 governmental	 structures	 and	 ca-
pacities	that	inevitably	characterize	such	environments.	At	the	heart	is	a	vi-
cious	cycle.	The	governments	lack	capacity	to	absorb	and	manage,	to	domes-











































































































merit	 based	 appointments,	 vetting	 procedures,	 and	 performance-based	 re-
views.	
General Principles: To	build	 long-term	 capacity	 for	 public administra-

















ciary	 institutions	 to	 receive	 and	 benefit	 from	 technical	 assistance.	Modest	
expectations	should	guide	planning.

















of	 sustainable	 capacity	depends	on	disciplined	 commitment	 to	 a	 long-term	
agenda,	development	of	institutional	arrangements	and	procedures	to	ensure	




Strategy Framework for the  
Assessment and Treatment of  
Fragile States38
By Clifford Zinnes, IRIS, University of Maryland















political	 than	 economic.	 It	 stresses	 group	behavioral	dynamics.	We	end	 this	














and	 governance—e.g.,	 bal	anc	ing	 the	 budget,	 training	 judges,	 or	 upgrading	





















ening	 the	 elements	of	 state	 capacity	 independently	of	one	another	will	have	
limited	and	possibly	unsustainable	effect.	Changes	should	be	made	across	the	
dimensions	of	state	capacity	in	order	to	strengthen	the	consti	tu	tional	order,	the	
prin	cipal	 instrument	 for	 making	 collective	 deci	sions	 and	 resolving	 conflicts	
(which	are	inevi	table	in	society)	in	ways	that	forestall	violence.41	State	failure	is	
almost	 always	 associated	with	violence,	which	has	been	 found	 to	have	 three	
















pirical	diagnostic	 steps	 that	 facilitate	understanding	of	 fra	gile	 states	and	the	
vagaries	of	the	insti	tu	tions	of	the	resulting	constitutional	order.	




ticular	 dynamic	 scenario	 of	 dysfunctional	 state	 behavior	 leading	 toward	 or	
having	pre	cipitated	failure.	A	complete	typology	of	11	syndromes	is	given	in	
Table	1	below	and	Table	2	on	the	next	page.43
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Table 2: Recovery Syndromes





























Step 2: Customize the selected syndromes. For	the	country	under	ana-
lysis,	spe	cify	the	relevant	play	ers,	their	beliefs,	payoffs	strategies,	and	modes	of	
inter	action	(see	tem	plate	in	Table	3	below).
Table 3: Analytic Narrative Template














Step 3: Characterize the dimensions of state capacity.	 Disaggregate	
state	capacity	into	its	political,	economic,	social,	and	security	(“PESS”)	ele-










Step 4: Construct the analytic narrative.	 Refine	 the	 cus	tom	ized	 syn-
dromes	 through	 detailed	 ana	lytic	 narratives—non-mathematical,	 refutable,	
game-theoretic	 stories—that	 impose	 consistency	between	 the	 syndromes	 and	
the	ana	ly	sis	of	the	PESS	dimensions.44
The	framework	above	helps	to	identify	when	a	state	is	in	danger	of	failing.	
Typically,	 states	 appear	on	 lists	of	 states	 at	 risk	because	one	or	more	of	 the	
warning	signs	listed	in	Table	5	below	suddenly	become	strikingly	visi	ble,	par-
ticularly	if	accompanied	by	signs	of	increasing	vio	lence.	However,	the	sudden	

































































from	political	 access,	 or	 poli	ti	cal	 office,	 or	 full	 citizenship;	
political	protests	or	strikes	involving	at	least	1	percent	of	the	
popu	la	tion	are	common	and	escalating	in	size	and	fre	quency	
(though	 these	might	 not	 occur	 in	 the	 extreme	 case	 where	







currency	 no	 longer	 desired	 and	 barter	 or	 dollarization	 is	















important	 customs	 or	 language;	 donors	 on	 brink	 or	 have	
stopped	supporting	the	government.









the	 persons	 displaced	 by	 conflict	 exceed	 5	 percent	 of	 the	
popu	la	tion.	















	 ·	 	Practitioners	 must	 recognize	 that	 failed	 and	 fragile	 states	 come	 in	
many	syndromes.	Culture	matters.	Donors	must	recognize	that	a	one-
size-policy	response	does	not	fit	all.	
	 ·	 	The	 fundamental	 source	 of	 any	 state’s	 resilience	 or	 fragility	 is	 the	















not	a	 low	bar.	Outsiders	 lack	knowledge	of	 local	 socio-political	 rela-
tionships.	Huge	inflows	of	foreign	exchange	can	exacerbate	corruption.	







	 ·	 	Practitioners	wishing	to	influ	ence	the	outcome	of	stra	te	gic	ally	diffi	 -
cult	situations	(a	“game”)	must	accept	that	they	generally	are	outsiders	
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	 ·	 	Owing	to	its	enormous	demands	ranging	from	humanitarian	emer-
gen	cies	 to	 infrastructure	 repair,	 the	 post-conflict	 situation	 and	 the	
































What is the right balance between central vs. local assistance? Fragile	
states	 and	especially	 failed	 states	 are	open	 to	challenges	not	 faced	by	more	
robust	states;	e.g.,	seces	sion,	accession,	and	agglom	eration.	In	such	environ-
































forces	 to	provide	secur	ity	 to	 the	parties	 to	a	conflict	might	be	neces	sary	 to	
create	a	cli	mate	of	effective	gov	ern	ance	in	which	the	par	ties	can	work	toward	
an	agreement	to	restore	institutions	considered	effective	and	legitimate.
Is donor reorganization part of the solution? Foreign	government	donor	
agencies	are	organiza	tions	with	a	multiplicity	of	objectives	(mostly	domestic)	
that	use	development	assistance	as	a	for	eign	policy	tool	to	fulfill	them.	Should	








with	 the	complexity	of	 the	problem?	The	United	States	has	an	 interagency	
framework	within	which	it	considers	aid,	among	other	issues.		Should	there	
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be	a	United	Nations	agency	through	which	national	governments	could	focus	

























Experimentation	 is	 necessary	 and	 so	 is	 eval	u	a	tion.	Without	 it,	 experi-
mentation	 is	 risky.	However,	 the	 incentive	 to	 exper	iment	 is	 greatly	dimin-
ished	if	the	chances	of	success	are	uncertain.	With	rigorous	evaluation,	am-













Policies to Reduce Lawlessness  
and Corruption




	 ·	 	Identify	major	 impediments	 to	stability	due	to	 lawlessness	
and	corruption;


























ed	countries	 always	 reflect	 the	unique	make-up	of	 their	 respective	 societies,	
such	countries	all	share	a	characteristic:	few	people	hold	jobs	yielding	regular	
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paychecks.	They	are	self-employed	or	work	as	day	laborers.	Their	inhabitants	







ing	 courts,	 and	 culturally-sensitive	 sanctions.	 Police	 accountability	 can	 be	
promoted	by	vetting	new	recruits,	embedding	foreign	advisors	within	police	
units,	 paying	 competitive	 salaries,	 removing	 corrupt	 or	 incompetent	 police	
personnel	on	the	basis	of	fair	and	transparent	procedures,	training	recruits	and	









In	 such	countries,	 the	 illegal	financing,	production,	and	distribution	of	
substances	such	as	drugs	often	pose	major	impediments	to	reactivation	of	eco-









including	 the	United	States,	have	had	mixed	 success.	Conversely,	while	 the	
dismissal	from	positions	of	power	or	the	side-lining	of	key	people	aiding	or	













ments	 to	 ghost	 employees	 and	 payroll	 skimming.	With	 the	 advent	 of	 cell	
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CHAPTER 20
Capture of the Informal Sector:  
Evidence from Bangui























The	CAR	 has	 its	 own	 internal	 divisions,	 characterized	 simply	 as	 north	
versus	south,	and	was	the	focus	of	a	successful	U.N.	peacekeeping	operation:	
the	United	Nations	Mission	 in	 the	Central	African	Republic	 (MINURCA)	
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The	number	of	official	markets	is	not	the	entire	story.	There	were	11	new	
or	semi-permanent	markets—four	supermarkets	and	seven	river-port	markets,	
one	of	which	was	 a	primary	market—and	 two	more	were	 recently	defined.	
Plus,	 there	 were	 three	 important	 specialty	markets,	 numerous	 spontaneous	









































collected	 taxes	 from	 22	 primary	markets	 in	 Bangui,	 while	 the	 office	 of	 the	
mayor	of	Bimbo	 (a	 contiguous	municipality)	 collected	 from	 four	 additional	
primary	markets.	Twenty-six	markets	is	the	quick	answer	to	the	question	above.









Bimbo’s Primary Food Markets
Bimbo	 Bégoua	(PK12)
Mpoko	Bac	 Boeing
  Source: BMS
















	 Port	Amont   
Source: BMS














 Apprentice Merchants: They	were	typically	young	men	and	women	who	
associated	themselves	as	retail	sellers	with	larger	successful	merchants.
 Small Wholesalers: These	vendors	differed	from	large	wholesalers	in	their	
financial	inability	to	mount	purchasing	expeditions	to	the	provinces.	
 Large Wholesalers: These	vendors	had	capital	at	their	disposal	to	engage	
in	field-to-consumer	commerce.	They	were	entrepreneurs	in	the	true	sense	
of	the	word.	There	were	relatively	few	of	them.
 Barter Traders: These	 traders	 were	 professionals	 highly	 knowledgeable	
about	the	relative	value	of	commodities.	They	took	manufactured	goods	
to	provincial	markets	that	they	traded	for	foodstuffs	and	local	products.
 Sometime-Merchant Producers: Farmers	who	sold	directly	in	the	Bangui	
markets.	
 Wholesale Producers: Some	farmers	sold	in	the	markets	as	small	wholesal-
ers.	They	sold	their	own	produce	in	large	lots	to	other	wholesalers.	





















                     Businesses     Percentage
	 	 Retail	(which	includes):	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 14,544	 	 	 	 	 	 74.3
	 	 	 	 Fruits	and	vegetables		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 20.5
	 	 	 	 Condiments		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 10.4
	 	 	 	 Misc.	manufactures	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 17.8
	 	 	 	 Shish	kababs	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 14.5
	 	 	 	 Cigarettes		 				 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 4.6
	 	 	 	 Other		 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 6.5
	 	 Coffee	shops;	hotels;	restaurants	 	 	 	 	 3,114		 	 	 	 	 	 15.9
	 	 Industry*	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 1,166		 	 	 	 	 	 6.0
	 	 Servics**;	Transport	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 520	 	 	 	 	 	 	 2.7
	 	 Wholesale		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 114	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.6
	 	 Agriculture,	Livestock	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 65	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.3
	 	 Construction,	Public	Works	 	 	 	 	 	 	 47	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.2																																																																																																																									
  Total	(number	of	firms	in	sector)		 	 	 19,570      100.0
	 	 *		Woodworkers,	tailors,	and	grinders
	 	 **	Repairs
 Source: DSEE, 1989
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This	 informal	 credit	 system	 seemed	 most	 prevalent—and	 successful—















Not	 surprisingly	 and	 to	 a	 very	 high	 degree,	 vendors	 knew	where	 they	 had	
bought	 the	 foodstuffs	 they	were	 selling.	Of	 the	 12,460	 product	 exposition	













food	 and	manufactured	 goods	 from	Cameroon,	 Chad,	 Sudan,	Nigeria	 and	
countries	from	around	the	world.	Exports	from	KM	5	went	on	to	markets	in	
Gabon	and	Congo.	While	the	merchants	at	KM	5	collectively	imported	many	
manufactured	goods,	 they	also	 imported	produce	 that	was	highly	 integrated	
into	 the	Central	 African	 diet:	 onions,	 peanuts,	 red	 pepper,	 garlic,	 and	 to	 a	
much	lesser	degree	millet,	sorghum,	and	rice.	They	imported	also	vegetable	oils	
produced	in	neighboring	countries	that	competed	directly	with	Central	Afri-
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sonal	 objectives	 included	 important	 aspects	 of	 lifestyle,	 religious,	 and	 gover-
nance	that	influenced	commercial	considerations.


































5	 	Stephen	Lewarne	and	David	Snelbecker,	Economic Governance in War Torn Economies: Les-
sons Learned from the Marshall Plan to the Reconstruction of Iraq,	report	prepared	for	the	U.S.	
Agency	for	International	Development	by	The	Services	Group	(Washington,	DC:	USAID,	
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACG436.pdf,	2004).	








Ethnic Composition of Food Crop Vendors
(percentage present in each market)
Market Yakoma Baya Mandja Ngbaka Banda Chadian
Central	 5.58	 5.86	 6.97	 5.87	 6.54	 1.89
Lakouanga	 8.84	 1.13	 1.31	 8.27	 3.00	 1.86
Maison	d’Etat	 0.92	 0.19	 0.00	 0.80	 0.82	 0.32
Sica	 10.77	 0.57	 0.44	 0.53	 0.54	 0.00
Sica		 25.19	 2.46	 0.65	 0.80	 3.81	 0.63
Ngbaka	 13.46	 0.38	 0.65	 5.87	 0.54	 0.00
Yapélé	 4.04	 0.00	 0.00	 1.60	 1.63	 0.95
Abattoir	 2.21	 0.38	 0.00	 2.40	 1.91	 0.00
Mamadou	 9.42	 4.54	 0.00	 6.40	 2.45	 3.15
	M’Baiki
Kokoro	 18.85	 18.90	 2.18	 40.53	 4.09	 17.67
Sambo	 2.31	 5.29	 3.70	 0.27	 0.27	 48.90
Boy	Rabe	 0.19	 13.23	 1.74	 1.07	 2.18	 0.00
Foûh	 0.00	 0.76	 10.68	 0.53	 0.27	 0.00
Miskine	 2.12	 7.75	 21.13	 0.27	 22.34	 5.99
Moustapha	 1.54	 3.59	 9.15	 1.33	 7.63	 6.62
Ngbenguéwé	 1.54	 3.97	 2.40	 0.27	 8.99	 5.05
Pétévo	 13.27	 1.32	 3.92	 12.80	 2.18	 3.15
Kassaï	 1.97	 1.32	 0.65	 1.87	 4.90	 1.58
Ouango	 3.08	 0.00	 1.53	 1.33	 5.99	 0.95
Gobongo	 0.38	 2.84	 0.22	 0.00	 3.81	 0.00
Combattants	 0.77	 11.53	 15.03	 0.53	 12.26	 0.00
Ngaragba	 0.77	 0.00	 12.42	 	0.00	 1.09	 0.63
Bégoua	 0.77	 2.08	 0.22	 0.00	 1.91	 0.00
Bimbo	 0.00	 0.00	 3.70	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00
Boeing	 0.77	 10.96	 1.09	 0.00	 0.00	 0.63
Mpoko	Bac	 0.38	 0.76	 0.22	 2.67	 0.00	 	0.00
Sans	Cas	 0.00	 0.19	 0.00	 4.00	 0.82	 0.00
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